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ABSTRACT 
Scholars who discuss copyright often observe that the 
voices for stronger copyright have more financial and political 
capital than their opponents and thus tend to win in Congress. 
While those facts are historically true, since the turn of the 
century, the politics around the issue have shifted substantially and 
become much messier and less predictable. This study illustrates 
this changing policy dynamic via a detailed political and 
legislative history of the major proposals regarding digital rights 
management and related areas of copyright, from 1987 to the 
present day. In 1987, there was no organized opposition to 
copyright’s expansion. Within fifteen years, however, there was a 
substantial coalition of opposition, including public intellectuals, 
allied journalists, and newly-founded nonprofits. By the mid-
2000s, this coalition had substantially slowed the expansion of 
copyright and even won substantial legislative support for 
proposals to limit copyright’s reach. Despite being badly outspent 
and having far fewer allies in Congress, the “strong fair use” 
coalition had fought the “strong copyright” coalition to a draw in 
two key debates in the mid-2000s. In early 2012, the strong 
copyright coalition tried to push through a pair of bills with far-
reaching implications for the Internet ecosystem—and it looked 
like they would ultimately prevail, until Internet activism led 
millions of voters to contact Congress in opposition. By looking at 
the political histories of all of these proposals in one place, this 
article shows an unmistakable trajectory in the politics of 
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copyright, from an era of relatively easy inter-industry negotiation 
toward an era in which copyright industries face a permanent, 
principled opposition, emboldened by having executed the largest 
online protest in history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The industries that produce and distribute copyrighted 
works have a long, well-documented history of fearing new media 
technologies. The best-known example came in a congressional 
hearing in 1982, when Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) chief Jack Valenti proclaimed, “I say to you that the VCR 
is to the American film producer and the American public as the 
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”1 While not 
matching Valenti’s hyperbole, Jason S. Berman, President of the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), expressed the 
same concern in a 1990 hearing. “[F]or many years, the music 
industry has been gravely concerned about the devastating impact 
of home taping… [which] presently displaces about one third of 
the industry’s sales… [at a cost of] nearly $1 billion per year.”2 
Berman predicted the negative economic impacts from new digital 
audio tape (DAT) systems would be even stronger.3 Even these 
were hardly the first protests against new media. Mark A. Lemley 
writes, “I sometimes suspect there was an association of monastic 
scriveners who protested the printing press.”4 He then ticks off 
several examples in the series of allegedly threatening new media 
technologies of the twentieth century, from the player piano and 
the gramophone to radio broadcasting, cable television, and the 
photocopier.5 
 The standard lesson from these examples is that each new 
technology became either a minor nuisance to the incumbent 
content providers or—as has been the case more often—an 
important development that actually expanded the market for 
licensed works. The more recent deluge of digital technologies, 
including especially the Internet, may well present an exception to 
this rule, but along with many others, I am quite skeptical.6 The 
                                                
1 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, 
H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion 
Picture Association of America). 
2 Digital Audio Tape Recorder Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2358 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commc’s of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 101st 
Cong. 86-87 (statement of Jason Berman, President, RIAA). 
3 Id. 
4 Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125 (2011). 
5 Id. at 126-28. 
6 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT (2012). Patry points out 
that 2010 was a banner year for the movie, music publishing, and book 
industries. Id. at 7. He also argues that, while record industry revenues have 
indeed declined, this is due primarily to the unbundling of music. “The decline 
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standard lesson provides a valuable backdrop for those who 
contend that the Internet should be allowed to grow without 
copyright-minded regulations; after all, if the “content industry . . . 
has a Chicken Little problem,”7 the sky is probably not falling this 
time, either. 
 While the standard lesson about the shortsightedness of the 
content industries is a valuable one to draw from this history, there 
is another lesson as well—a story about the political trajectory of 
copyright that helps us in our role as political observers rather than 
as gladiators. Here, the lesson focuses on which of two broad fates 
greets each new technology: whether the law accepts each new 
technology into the mix, or the law becomes a tool to limit, ban, or 
otherwise render each harmless. Here, the recent past really is 
different. Until the 1980s, new technologies were either 
accommodated via minor changes in copyright law or 
begrudgingly accepted despite some marginal infringement. 
Phonographs and radio airplay became and remain lucrative 
sources of mechanical royalties for composers. TV broadcasters 
moaned when pioneer CATV systems retransmitted their signals, 
but, in the decades since, retransmission fees have added 
substantially to the bottom lines of broadcasters; they are expected 
to reach $3 billion per year by 2015.8 Photocopiers, viewed with 
trepidation by book and periodical publishers, were accommodated 
by adjustments to the copyright statute and the creation of a new 
organization for collecting royalties,9 and, rather than shrinking 
profits, journal publishers have seen their profits balloon.10 “The 
VCR made possible the home video market, a market which today 
generates more than double the revenues collected at the box 
office—at a time when box office admissions have also shown 
                                                                                                         
in CD sales and the increase in digital singles sales have nothing to do with 
piracy, and is instead a reflection of record companies’ inability to continue their 
long-standing practice of forcing consumers to buy CDs and therefore albums.” 
Id. at 68. 
7 Lemley, supra note 4, at 132. 
8 Joe Flint, Broadcast Networks Will Rake In Retransmission Fees, Report Says, 
L.A. TIMES BLOGS: COMPANY TOWN (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2011/11/broadcast-
networks-retransmission-consent-fees.html. 
9 Christopher Jensen, Note, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the 
Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 
551-52 (2003). 
10 For instance, in 2010, journal publisher “Elsevier reported a 36 percent profit 
on revenues of $3.2 billion.” Thomas Lin, Mathematicians Organize Boycott of 




Herman: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DRM AND RELATED COPYRIGHT DEBATES
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012




strong growth.”11 It is easy to paper over the acrimony, including 
lawsuits and lobbying, that greeted these formerly new 
technologies, but still, each of these stories ultimately ended with 
content companies accepting the new technology.  
 The movie industry’s strategic response to the VCR, 
however, represents something of an inflection point in content 
industries’ strategies. If they had followed the previous historical 
examples, the motion picture industry would have sought a modest 
change in the copyright statute, for instance by collecting royalties 
on machines and blank tapes. Instead, they went to court to have 
the VCR effectively banned, and in the case that resulted—Sony v. 
Universal City Studios—four members of the Supreme Court were 
ready to do just that.12 Jack Valenti was not just expressing 
concern about infringing uses of a new technology; he was 
attacking the technology itself. This attack failed—barely—but it 
put technology innovators on notice that the content industries 
would try to act as gatekeepers not only at the box office and 
record store, but in the electronics shop as well. This focus on 
technology and technological innovators has continued to this day, 
and the copyright lobby has continued to adopt an aggressive 
stance toward each new technology. The Sony decision was a 
setback to this agenda; as the majority famously wrote, “the sale of 
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is 
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it 
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”13 Yet 
the content industries were not to be dissuaded, and their efforts 
have eroded Sony to the point that media technologies are 
developed amidst a fear of legal liability.14 Copyright has shifted 
from a law that regulated only copying behavior into a system that 
regulates copying technology, driven by content industry fears that 
new technologies—especially the Internet—will effectively 
destroy their business models.15 
Spearheading this effort to ban or neuter new media 
technologies via stronger copyright law are the media 
conglomerates that dominate the entertainment industry. The 
lobbying groups for the movie studios (MPAA) and record 
                                                
11 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
829, 840-41 (2008) (citation omitted). 
12 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 
(1984). 
13 Id. at 442. 
14 Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect 
Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007). 
15 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
54-82 (2008). 
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companies (RIAA) are the best-known and most active, but other 
content producers such as print publishers, music publishers, sports 
leagues, and some in the software and video game industries also 
lend their efforts. Along with their political allies, such as many 
members of Congress and other government officials, I call this 
group the “strong copyright” (or SC) coalition.16 
While the SC coalition had faced little organized resistance 
before, the dawn of the twenty-first century saw the growth and 
flourishing of a coalition deliberately designed as a political 
counterweight. This coalition generally argues against the 
expansion of copyright and for the broadening of exceptions, 
limitations, and affirmative defenses, especially fair use; thus, I 
call this coalition the strong fair use (or SFU) coalition.17 The SFU 
coalition is not merely anti-copyright, however. Its rallying cry is 
two-fold: freedom of expression and freedom to tinker.18 SFU 
advocates argue that copyright has grown to a degree that it has 
fundamentally compromised these freedoms, leaving our society 
with less speech and less innovation as a result. With these 
powerful motivating ideals in hand, the SFU coalition rose from 
virtual nonexistence to serious political impact in under a decade. 
That transition is an important inflection point in the political 
history of copyright law. 
The content industries, on the other hand, have looked at 
digital technology with trepidation, seeing not a vehicle for greater 
speech and innovation, but a threat to their business models. As a 
key component of their strategic response, the SC coalition has 
sought to use digital technology to prevent unauthorized access to 
and use of copyrighted works. These digital technologies 
collectively referred to as Digital Rights Management (DRM), 
include techniques such as encryption and watermarking that can 
keep works locked in a technological box, branded with ownership 
identity, or otherwise distributed in such a way as to slow or 
discourage unapproved uses. 
While working on a study19 of the representations of the 
DRM policy debate across congressional hearings, newspapers, 
                                                
16 Bill D. Herman, Taking the Copyfight Online: Comparing the Copyright 
Debate in Congressional Hearings, in Newspapers, and on the Web, 17 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 354 (2012). 
17 Herman, supra note 16. 
18 The former is the title of a book by an SFU-allied communication scholar. 
KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION 
IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2007). The latter is the title of a well-
regarded blog founded by an SFU-allied computer scientist, Ed Felten. 
FREEDOM TO TINKER, https://freedom-to-tinker.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
19 BILL D. HERMAN, THE BATTLE OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: A 
MULTI-METHOD STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT 
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and the web—including an exploration of the SFU coalition’s 
heavy use of Internet advocacy—I was surprised to find no 
previous research tying together the political histories of these very 
related debates. This study does just that, exploring the twists and 
turns that characterized each of what I consider the 4 major DRM 
policy debates of the past 25 years. It examines the debates leading 
up to the passage of the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA)20 
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),21 as well as 
stalled efforts to mandate a DRM technology called the “broadcast 
flag” and attempts to reform the DMCA. I explore each of these 
debates in detail, laying bare the technological, economic, and 
political background, the specific policy proposals advanced, and 
some of the political forces that helped shape each outcome. 
Because these DRM debates have also been shaped by and have 
helped to shape other key developments in the politics of 
copyright, I also have two additional sections, one exploring the 
key years between the passage of the DMCA and the beginning of 
the later debates, and the other discussing important developments 
in the last five years. 
By looking at these milestones in the evolution of digital 
copyright in one place, this study tells an as-yet untold story about 
the trajectory of copyright advocacy in general. It also sets out a 
roadmap for observers to better understand the contemporary 
copyright debate, as well as to be better equipped for anticipating 
where it is headed. In particular, it is only by understanding the 
coalitions that are party to the debate, as well as their evolving 
political and communication strategies, that one can have a full 
grasp of the significance and likely future direction of copyright in 
the digital era. While this understanding carries several lessons, the 
emerging significance of nonprofit actors such as NGOs and 
scholars is an under-appreciated phenomenon that bears special 
emphasis. These actors have fundamentally reshaped the politics of 
copyright, making possible what was formerly impossible and 
making far more difficult what was once taken for granted. 
I. AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT (AHRA): 1987 TO 
1992 
 
In the early 1980s, electronics manufacturers began 
developing devices to record and play Digital Audio Tape (DAT). 
                                                                                                         
TECHNOLOGIES (UMI Dissertation No. 3363366) (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1357203. 
20 Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 
106 Stat. 4237 (1992). 
21 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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DAT promised consumers the ability to make their own recordings 
with the fidelity of compact discs (CDs)—the latter being a read-
only medium at the time. Yet not everybody was excited by the 
prospect of consumers having the capacity to make perfect digital 
copies—let alone copies of copies. 
A. Legal Threats and a Legislative Compromise 
 The music industry, already having advanced the complaint 
that “Home taping is killing music,”22 was quite scared of DAT. 
As the New York Times observed: 
 
[T]he president of the Recording Industry 
Association of America, Stanley Gortikov, . . . 
characterized the Japanese-dominated audio 
hardware industry as an “assassin” bent on 
destruction of the largely American recording 
industry. “We are already losing billions to home 
taping,” Mr. Gortikov said recently . . . “Imagine 
what it will be like if the tape copy is equal to the 
original.”23 
 
DAT decks were expected to arrive on U.S. store shelves by 
1987,24 but the recording industry used lobbying, threatened and 
actual litigation against Sony, and market pressure to stop the 
manufacturer from importing DAT machines.25 The recording 
industry was far better prepared for a court fight. “The RIAA held 
a million dollars in readiness for legal fees and let it be known that 
it was financially girded for battle. . . . [Also,] Japanese 
manufacturers of DAT recorders, mindful of already strained trade 
relations with the United States, wanted to avoid the publicity 
resulting from a lawsuit, even one they would likely win.”26 
Additionally, record labels could and did refuse to release music in 
                                                
22 Jim Sullivan, Rock the Boat, Billy Bragg, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1988, at 
51. 
23 Will Crutchfield, Next Home Stereo Advance: Digital Tape Cassettes in 1987, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/24/arts/next-
home-stereo-advance-digital-tape-cassettes-in-1987.html.  
24 Id. 
25 Menell & Nimmer, supra note 14, at 161-62.  
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DAT format, greatly diminishing the potential demand for the 
machines.27 
 Starting in 1987, the recording industry supported 
legislation to require that DAT recorders sold or imported into the 
U.S. include copy-control technologies.28 CBS Records developed 
a system that depends on very minor changes to the audible sound. 
The change likely would have been inaudible to most listeners—
but audible for the very audiophiles who were the primary target 
market.29 Congressional hearings considering early legislation met 
substantial electronics industry resistance,30 and the lack of inter-
industry consensus around a workable technology kept these 
proposals from serious consideration. Tensions between the 
recording industry and electronics manufacturers eased when Sony 
purchased CBS Records in January of 1988.31 Still, the legal 
threats kept DAT decks out of U.S. stores. 
In 1989, the industries came to terms, apparently clearing 
the legal cloud around DAT.32 The terms of the agreement required 
DAT decks to include a different copy control technology. This 
system, the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS), does not 
alter the audible sound of recordings; rather, it adds an inaudible, 
one bit signal that indicates whether the tape is an original or a 
copy. Using SCMS-equipped recorders, consumers can make a 
perfect digital copy of an original recording but cannot make 
copies of copies. Allowing only first-generation copies represented 
a compromise between the industries; in return for this limitation, 
record labels agreed not to sue DAT manufacturers or users over 
home recording.33 
                                                
27 Andrew Pollack, Digital Tape Machines Expected by July, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/08/business/digital-tape-machines-
expected-by-july.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
28 Hyangsun Lee, The Audio Broadcast Flag System: Can It Be a Solution?, 12 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 452 (2007).  
29 Andrew Pollack, Move to End Digital Tape Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/16/business/moves-to-end-digital-tape-
dispute.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
30 Digital Audio Tape Recorders: Hearing on H.R. 1384 Before the House 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness, 100th Cong. 
(1987); Digital Audio Tape Recorder Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 506 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 100th Cong. (1987). 
31 Peter J. Boyer, Sony and CBS Records: What a Romance!, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Sept. 18, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/18/magazine/sony-and-cbs-
records-what-a-romance.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
32 Andrew Pollack, Accord Clears the Way for Digital Tape Recorders, N.Y. 
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 Both industries sought legislation codifying this deal.34 
However, record companies were not the only music industry 
group with a legal threat in store; songwriters and music publishers 
were not satisfied by the proposed accord and used their own legal 
threat against DAT: 
 
The National Music Publishers Association 
[NMPA], a New York group representing music 
copyright holders . . . thinks [SCMS] does not 
restrict copying enough and can be circumvented 
easily. The organization favors charging buyers of 
tape machines and blank tapes a royalty fee that 
would go to compensate the songwriters and music 
publishers.35  
 
Backed by the NMPA,36 songwriter Sammy Cahn filed a lawsuit 
accusing Sony of contributory infringement.37 Had it gone to court, 
the case would have faced long odds; the parallel with Sony v. 
Universal38 was almost exact. Despite the weakness of the Cahn 
suit, Sony decided against another extended legal fight and “settled 
about a year into the litigation”39 in June of 1991.40 In addition to 
implementing SCMS, the manufacturers agreed to pay a copyright 
royalty on DAT decks and blank tapes. Further, they agreed to 
support new legislation that would require SCMS and the 
collection of royalties for all digital audio recording devices.41 In 
return for the electronic industries’ support, the music industry 
agreed to statutory language that, first, gives consumers the 
explicit legal right to make noncommercial recordings for personal 
enjoyment, and, second, gives manufacturers the legal right to help 
them do so.42 
 There were voices of resistance during the legislative 
process, and some of their reasons for opposing the bill were 
                                                
34 See supra note 2. 
35 Andrew Pollack, Suit Seeks to Bar Sale of New Audio Players, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 11, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/11/business/suit-seeks-to-bar-
sale-of-new-audio-players.html. 
36 Id. 
37 Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990). 
38 Sony Corp. Of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
39 Menell & Nimmer, supra note 14, at 162 (citations omitted). 
40 Lee, supra note 28, at 452. 
41 Eben Shapiro, Accord on Digital Taping Now Faces Congress Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/12/business/company-
news-accord-on-digital-taping-now-faces-congress-debate.html. 
42 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006). 
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insightful or even prescient.43 Well-reasoned though they were, 
however, these opponents were not part of any substantially 
mobilized resistance and thus went unheeded. For instance, 
consumer groups expressed their doubts but participated with 
resignation; rather than opposing the bill outright, they described it 
as a regrettable necessity in the face of the music industry’s legal 
threats. The National Consumers League appeared at one hearing 
and backed the bill on these terms.44 Consumers Union 
representatives appeared in two Washington Post articles, 
describing the royalty as unfair but assessing the bill as the only 
means to get DAT into the market.45 Scholarly opposition was 
more genuinely against the bill as drafted, but their participation 
was also light; law professor Jessica Litman opposed the bill,46 as 
did Philip Greenspun, then a research assistant at MIT—though he 
was also serving as president of a small technology company.47 
With such minor resistance and all the major affected industries 
signing on, the bill sailed into law in 1992.48 
B. The AHRA’s Effects and Political Significance 
The AHRA was outdated quickly after it became law. In 
order to avoid royalties on their products, computer companies had 
helped to make sure that the act did not regulate general-purpose 
computers, software, or blank computer media.49 As today’s 
consumer well knows, this demarcation between personal media 
equipment and computing equipment did not hold for long. By the 
                                                
43 See, e.g., Digital Audio Tape Recorder Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2358 
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’s of the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci. & 
Transp., 101st Cong. 169-80 (1990) (statement of Philip Greenspun, President, 
Isosonics Corp.) (arguing, inter alia, that neither DAT nor the AHRA would 
substantially change the amount of infringement and that consumers would 
generally not adopt DAT).  
44 Audio Home Recording Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 1623 Before the Subcomm. 
on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd 
Cong. 74 (1991) (statement of Linda F. Golodner, Executive Director, National 
Consumers League). 
45 Stephen Levine, The Digital Duel Could Be Ending; Manufacturers, Music 
Industry Reach Pact, WASH. POST, July 11, 1991, at B8; John Burgess, Bill 
Imparts the Sound of Music; Congress Settles Long-Standing Dispute Over 
Digital Recording, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1992, at F1. 
46 Audio Home Recording Act of 1991, Hearing on H.R. 3204 Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. & Judicial Admin. Of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 178 (1992) (statement of Jessica Litman, Professor of 
Law, Wayne State University). 
47 See supra note 43. 
48 Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 
106 Stat. 4237 (1992).  
49 Id. §1001. 
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mid 1990s, computer CD burners allowed music fans to engage in 
unlimited serial copying without paying royalties, and the PC as 
home entertainment center was already becoming a reality.50 The 
courts also found that the act does not regulate MP3 players,51 a 
ruling that helped keep costs low for the iPod and all its progeny. 
In 1992, policymakers and interested industries envisioned 
a future for digital music that looked like a higher-fidelity version 
of what was then the present—one in which media consumption 
was tethered to standalone media players playing special-purpose 
media. What happened instead was nothing less than a home 
entertainment revolution based around computer-based copying 
and consumption, all of which falls outside the act’s regulatory 
bounds. It began with computer-based, royalty-free burning of CDs 
for playback on home and car CD players. Then the invention and 
explosive adoption of peer-to-peer systems such as Napster put the 
PC squarely in the center of music consumption.52 By persuading 
the record labels to sign on to the iTunes music store in 2002,53 
Apple provided the first commercially successful means of 
collecting on the Internet distribution of music, but there was no 
putting the Internet genie back into the bottle—and certainly no 
going back to the era of the standalone music player. 
Because policymakers and the electronics and music 
industries understandably did not foresee this revolution in how 
music would be acquired, distributed, and consumed, the AHRA 
was drafted in such a way that it quickly became irrelevant. DAT 
decks and other regulated technologies, such as the Sony 
MiniDisc, never caught on with consumers; consumers greatly 
preferred unregulated computer-based CD burners.54 Since AHRA-
regulated technologies never achieved widespread adoption, the 
legislative history of the act has received light treatment by legal 
scholars, and commentators who do discuss it have dismissed it as 
a minor step on the route to more substantial DRM regulation.55 
                                                
50 Dan Stets, Pump up the PC, PHILA. INQ., April 11, 1996, 
http://articles.philly.com/1996-04-11/business/25659510_1_full-motion-video-
computer-altec-lansing. 
51 Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). 
52 JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF 
MUSIC (2001). 
53 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF 
A BORDERLESS WORLD 118-21 (2006). 
54 Pieter Kleve & Feyo Kolff, MP3: The End Of Copyright As We Know It?, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IASTED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY (LAWTECH’99) AUGUST 9-12, 1999, HONOLULU, HAWAII, 32-37, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1138651. 
55 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The Digital Broadcast Migration: 
Rewriting the Telecommunications Act: Communications Law Reform: 
Communication’s Copyright Policy, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97, 
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The AHRA is historically significant as the first DRM 
regulation of any kind, as well as the first copyright law mandating 
the adoption of a specific technology.56 On both counts, the AHRA 
thus represents the first step in copyright’s transition into a vehicle 
for regulating devices. After the AHRA, it became illegal to make 
and sell stand-alone digital audio recording devices with 
unrestricted functionality—this even though unrestricted devices 
would have had the kinds of substantial noninfringing uses that the 
Supreme Court ruled as exculpatory in Sony.57 
The passage of the AHRA also shows how DRM policy 
debates through the end of the twentieth century continued to 
follow the industry-led legislation process that Jessica Litman 
identifies in copyright generally.58 As in other instances, Congress 
urged the affected industries to reach a generally acceptable 
compromise and, once one was reached, passed it as law. The 
motivation for record companies and music publishers was clear 
enough; the former wanted to reduce the number of illicit digital 
copies competing with their official recordings, and the latter 
wanted another source of licensing revenues. Technology 
companies supported the bill—not on principle, but because they 
wanted to design and sell their products without being sued. Even 
though Sony and others disliked the need for protective legislation, 
they grudgingly accepted it as better than unending litigation. By 
the early 1990s, the electronics industry was practically begging 
for the AHRA’s passage so they could finally import DAT decks—
a technology that had already been available abroad for years by 
that point.59 
Finally, the debate also foreshadowed the battle lines that 
would be hardened in later debates. The AHRA is the first effort to 
use copyright law to shape product design, growing from 
supporters’ belief that if technology can cause them problems in 
the form of easier copying, other technology—backed by law—can 
also solve that same problem. In contrast, opponents argued that 
                                                                                                         
106 n.51 (2005); see also Lee, supra note 28, at 411 n.197. Had AHRA-
regulated technologies become widely adopted, the act would have been more 
significant. It is the more recent changes in the music industry, rather than the 
text of the act itself, that made it relatively unimportant. 
56 Van Houweling, supra note 55, at 102 n.27. 
57 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984). 
58 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23 (2001). (“About one hundred years 
ago, Congress got into the habit of revising copyright law by encouraging 
representatives of the industries affected by copyright to hash out among 
themselves what changes needed to be made and then present Congress with the 
text of the appropriate legislation.”). 
59 Pollack, supra note 35 (observing that, as of July 1989, DAT decks had “been 
available in Japan, and to a limited extent in Europe, for about two years”). 
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DRM and a law against its circumvention would inconvenience 
customers, drive up prices, and prevent noninfringing uses, all 
while failing to prevent infringement to any significant degree. 
These battle lines grew more entrenched during the debate leading 
up to and following the passage of the DMCA. 
II. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA): 
1995 TO 199860 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or DMCA,61 is the 
most sweeping revision to copyright law of the last 30 years “and 
arguably represents the most dramatic change in the history of U.S. 
copyright law.”62 The Act was an effort “to bring U.S. copyright 
law ‘squarely into the digital age,’ . . . [and] [t]he primary 
battleground in which the [Act] achieved this goal is its first 
title.”63 This title64 was billed as an implementation of two World 
Intellectual Property Organization treaties,65 which the United 
States signed in 1996. 
A. Addressing the Looming Internet Threat 
The story of this law begins with what James Boyle 
describes as the “Internet Threat.”66 Copyright holders view the 
Internet as a substantial technological challenge that cannot be 
addressed through AHRA-style legislation. By 1994, the World 
Wide Web was spreading into broader use,67 and, over the next 
few years, users started going online by the tens of millions. In 
                                                
60 Portions of this section are adapted from Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy 
Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA 
Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2006).  
61 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
62 TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL 
CULTURE 177 (2007). 
63 David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 681-82 (2000) (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 
(1998)).  
64 WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation 
Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006). 
65 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 65, arts. 11-12 (1997) [hereinafter WCT], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_ wo033.html; World Intellectual 
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 76., arts. 18-19 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT], available at http://www. 
wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html. 
66 BOYLE, supra note 15, at 54-82.  
67 CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE 
SOFTWARE 223 (2008). 
15
Herman: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DRM AND RELATED COPYRIGHT DEBATES
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012




light of this growth, copyright holders came to fear the Internet and 
developed policy proposals to address the threat of online 
infringement. Media companies threatened that, unless Congress 
made the Internet safe for content via stronger copyright 
protection, copyright holders would not put their works online, 
depriving the new medium of attractive content. Policymakers 
generally had little online experience, leaving them open to the 
myth that the Internet needed content—even at a time when the 
content online was growing exponentially without major media 
participation.68 
The content industry sought to tame Internet distribution 
via DRM systems backed by the force of law, and Bruce Lehman 
is the policy actor who gets the most credit for advancing the legal 
part of the equation. Lehman was Patent Commissioner from 1993 
to 1998. Lehman also headed the White House Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, which released a White Paper69 that 
encouraged copyright holders to deploy DRM systems. Because 
DRM can be circumvented, the White Paper also called for laws 
that would prohibit the circumvention of DRM and ban the tools of 
circumvention. 
This was before there was a well-organized and identifiable 
SFU coalition, but the White Paper  caused “dismay among 
libraries, composers, writers, online service providers . . . and the 
makers of consumer electronic devices and computer hardware.”70 
Several law professors also opposed the White Paper proposals. 
Immediately following its release, American University law 
professor Peter Jaszi “held informal consultations with like-
thinking law professors and representatives of library organizations 
to see whether there was any possibility of mounting an effective 
opposition to the White Paper’s proposals.”71 Jaszi recruited other 
White Paper opponents, including “library organizations, online 
service providers, telephone companies, computer hardware and 
software manufacturers, consumer electronics companies, and civil 
rights and consumer protection organizations.”72 This group of 
interests agreed to work together, calling themselves the Digital 
Future Coalition, or DFC.73 The DFC succeeded in mobilizing 
                                                
68 LITMAN, supra note 58, at 93-94. 
69 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE: WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS & BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF 
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995). 
70 LITMAN, supra note 58, at 93. 
71 Id. at 123. 
72 Id. 
73 A Description of the Digital Future Coalition, DIGITAL FUTURE COALITION, 
http://www.dfc. org/dfc1/Learning_Center/about.html (last visited Mar. 14, 
2008). 
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substantial—and, from the standpoint of Lehman and the content 
industries, unexpected—opposition to Lehman’s suggested 
changes. Nonetheless, this was the first effort at a substantial 
multi-sector coalition opposed to the interests of the SC coalition. 
Thus, Jaszi and company were not well positioned to stop these 
proposals. 
The bill contained a categorical ban on the importation, 
development, and distribution of tools to circumvent DRM.74 It 
also contained bans on the removal or alteration of copyright 
management information—data that identifies the copyright holder 
and related information.75 The legislation also contained civil 
penalties of up to $2,500 per violation of the section 1201 ban on 
trafficking in tools that circumvent DRM and up to $25,000 per 
violation of the section 1202 ban on removal or alteration of 
copyright management information.76 Finally, the bill stipulated 
criminal penalties of up to $500,000 or five years in prison for 
anybody convicted of violating “section 1202 with intent to 
defraud.”77 
All DFC members saw this bill as a bad policy idea that 
would have a net negative effect on society. Many also feared it as 
a looming legal liability that could threaten them directly, so they 
mobilized enough constituents to stop the bill’s easy passage. This 
development surprised Lehman, who was so confident of domestic 
passage that he had already begun pushing for an international 
treaty with similar provisions via the appropriate United Nations 
agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Yet 
Lehman used the international momentum to his advantage.78 
Supporters were able to secure the passage of two related treaties 
through WIPO79 even as the domestic legislation stalled. U.S. 
delegates advanced a proposed treaty that looked much like the 
proposed domestic legislation: ban circumvention and ban the tools 
that make circumvention possible. A critical mass of the 
negotiators from other countries rejected this proposal—like Jaszi 
and the DFC, who saw a lot to oppose in such a strong ban. The 
resulting compromise led to a treaty with much weaker language 
than the US proposal; it requires only that countries discourage the 
act of circumvention, and it does not require a ban on 
circumvention tools or services. On this count, the treaties are 
                                                
74 NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong. § 1201. The 
companion House bill was nearly identical. NII Copyright Protection Act of 
1995, H.R. 2441, § 1201.  
75 Id. § 1202(b). 
76 Id. § 1203(c)(3). 
77 Id. § 1204. 
78 LITMAN, supra note 58, at 129. 
79 WCT, supra note 65; WPPT, supra note 65. 
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much closer to the traditional contours of U.S. copyright than is the 
U.S. legislation that passed; before the 1990s, U.S. copyright had 
regulated copying behavior but not copying technologies.80 
In a second important compromise with critics, the treaties 
impose a rather low standard for implementing legislation. A 
signatory must only “provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies” against circumvention of DRM and 
removal of copyright management information.81 U.S. law 
arguably met the treaties’ standard before the DMCA’s passage. It 
was already illegal to circumvent DRM to conduct copyright 
infringement, and manufacturers of “black box” devices that only 
served to circumvent DRM had already been subjected to legal 
liability for facilitating infringement.82 The “Clinton 
Administration initially considered sending the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty to the Senate for ratification ‘clean’ of implementing 
legislation.”83 
Rather than merely supporting simple treaty ratification, SC 
advocates—including congressional allies—made a more 
sophisticated use of the treaties. They engaged in “policy 
laundering,” or the use of international law-making bodies to 
advance one’s domestic agenda.84 As Oscar Gandy and I argue 
elsewhere: 
 
Congress used the [WIPO Copyright] Treaty as an 
excuse to implement a much more sweeping ban on 
circumvention. In short, Lehman and the bill’s 
congressional supporters used WIPO to launder 
their own interests, running their political capital 
through the bank of international credibility and 
treating the final bill as something required by 
international law.85  
 
Despite the SC coalition’s disappointment with the relative 
weakness of the final treaty language, they took advantage of the 
documents’ relative vagueness, urging passage of much stronger 
legislation in the name of compliance with treaty obligations. In 
congressional hearings in 1997 and 1998, at least 10 witnesses 
                                                
80 Nimmer, supra note 63, at 683. 
81 WCT, supra note 65; WPPT, supra note 65. 
82 LITMAN, supra note 58, at 131. 
83 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
520, 530 (1999).  
84 Herman & Gandy, supra note 60, at 130-35 (2006); see also Ian Hosein, The 
Sources of Laws: Policy Dynamics in a Digital and Terrorized World, 20 THE 
INFO. SOC’Y 187, 189 (2004). 
85 Herman & Gandy, supra note 60, at 131. 
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made this argument.86 Several even praised the stronger legislation 
for its likely effect of getting legislation passed in other countries 
that would similarly exceed the minimum threshold of WIPO 
treaty compliance. For instance, Representative Bart Gordon 
argued, “once we pass something here, it has to go to the 
international community. . . . They are really waiting for us to see 
what we are going to do. So whatever we do is the ceiling, not the 
floor.”87 Thus, while the patina of compliance with the treaty gave 
the bill some extra credibility, even supporters agreed that the bill 
exceeded what was required. 
B. Crafting the DMCA 
 The final legislation is built around the kind of strong 
regulation Lehman sought. Section 1201 implements three 
different bans. The first ban (or the “basic ban”) prohibits 
circumventing DRM to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted 
works. It reads, “No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.”88 For example, if a computer program requires a unique 
serial number during installation, this makes it illegal for a 
technically sophisticated user to defeat or hack this requirement 
and install the software without such a serial number. While doing 
so for the purpose of infringing copyright was already illegal, this 
clause bans it for nearly any reason—even if one has misplaced the 
serial number for a legally purchased software package and intends 
to install it on just one computer. The statute itself makes few 
allowances for even the most benign of uses, such as efforts to 
preserve the data on a decaying disk. 
The second ban prohibits manufacturing, importing, and 
trafficking in tools that would help circumvent access-controlling 
DRM.89 A technology is covered by this ban if it is developed, 
marketed, or primarily used for such circumvention. This ban (the 
“access trafficking ban”) prohibits computer-repair services from 
assisting a librarian in the preservation of software stored on 
decaying media, and it prohibits librarians from developing a 
technology to facilitate circumvention. 
Some DRM systems do not prevent unauthorized access 
but instead prevent certain uses of copyrighted works, especially 
                                                
86 Id. at 133. 
87 The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, & Consumer Prot., 105th Cong. 8 
(1998) (statement of Hon. Bart Gordon, Member, House Comm. on Commerce). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
89 Id. § 1201(a)(2). 
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unauthorized copying. The third ban (the “additional violations 
ban”) prohibits trafficking in tools to facilitate the circumvention 
of DRM if that DRM protects any copyright holder’s right.90 For 
example, the music industry had briefly experimented with DRM-
restricted CDs. These discs are not easily copied by computers, but 
the DRM systems do not prevent access; CD players require no 
access key or code to play them and thus generally play them 
without problems. This provision would ban a technology designed 
or marketed to circumvent this DRM system—for instance, a tool 
that would allow a consumer to convert the audio files from this 
CD into MP3 format on her hard drive. The proposed bills and 
final legislation all left untouched the right to circumvent use-
controlling DRM such as this. Thus, a determined end user would 
be well within her rights to circumvent the DRM on a music CD, 
but it would be illegal for her to develop, sell, or market a service 
or software program that did so. 
 The 105th Congress added a number of amendments to the 
bill. In the House bill as introduced,91 a very brief section 1201 
lays out the three bans with no explicit exceptions. It contains the 
following caveat, which is also included in the final legislation: 
“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or 
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this 
title.”92 While this may seem like a large caveat, the DMCA does 
not change the definition of infringement; it simply adds an 
additional set of prohibitions. Thus, most of the limitations, 
exclusions, and affirmative defenses built into copyright law do not 
limit the DMCA’s reach. Most importantly, fair use is not a 
defense against charges of circumvention or trafficking in 
circumvention devices. The language in the 1997 bill also applies 
criminal penalties of up to a million dollars in fines and up to ten 
years in prison for violating section 1201 or 1202 “willfully and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”93 
These penalties remained in the final legislation as enacted.94 
Facing mobilized opposition—including librarians, privacy 
advocates, encryption researchers, and computer industry 
representatives—the bill’s supporters made several narrow 
concessions, each creating a limited reprieve from one or more of 
the three bans. These caveats are clear attempts to address the 
concerns of a specific sector without much reduction in the bill’s 
reach. Librarians opposed the bill and got a very limited exception; 
they may circumvent DRM “to make a good faith determination of 
                                                
90 Id. § 1201(b). 
91 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997).  
92 Id. § 1201(d), encoded at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c). 
93 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 1204(a) (1997). 
94 17 U.S.C. § 1204. 
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whether to acquire a copy of that work,”95 but not to preserve 
works they have already purchased.96 Software designers and 
information technology researchers spoke in opposition and got 
some more substantial breathing room to do their jobs,97 though 
not enough to prevent some major professional headaches for some 
bona fide researchers doing legitimate work, as discussed below. 
The Electronic Privacy Information Center testified in opposition, 
so they won the right to circumvent DRM in order to protect their 
personal information.98 Each opposition group got a concession in 
rough proportion to its political capital. For the bill’s backers, this 
was vastly preferable to permitting a general-purpose exemption 
for otherwise noninfringing uses—let alone an exception for 
technologies that are capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
The basic ban is also subject to additional, temporary 
exemptions. Every three years, under the supervision of the 
Librarian of Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office holds hearings to 
consider proposed exemptions from the ban on circumventing 
access-controlling DRM systems.99 The procedure moves 
questions of fair use away from relatively fair use-friendly federal 
courts and into the hands of the Register of Copyrights, a clear 
member of the SC coalition—a shift of venue that substantially 
favors the SC coalition.100 Though several exemptions have been 
granted in each rulemaking, the statute and the Register of 
Copyright’s interpretation of the rules for determining exemptions 
                                                
95 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)(1). 
96 This exemption is not very useful in practice, to say the least. Librarians who 
want to make informed decisions about DRM-encrypted media such as DVDs 
can borrow them from other libraries, and they will only buy them if they have 
the appropriate technology to view them without circumvention. This exemption 
could apply to a librarian who wants to decide whether or not to purchase a 
networked resource such as a specialized database, but for it to be necessary, a 
librarian would need to approach a database vendor, ask for a trial subscription 
to a database to which the library is considering subscribing, and be rebuffed. It 
is highly unlikely that any company that sells their products to libraries would 
act so directly against their own best interests. Even in such an outlandishly 
unlikely scenario, a determined librarian would still likely be very 
uncomfortable with her legal footing for accessing such a resource, not only in 
light of § 1201, but also due to other federal and state laws against the 
unauthorized access of computing resources. For instance, in the estimation of 
this non-lawyer, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029-1030 would seem not to apply, but the lack 
of such clear applicability would be small comfort. While the DMCA is poorly 
thought out on many counts—including, importantly, in its assumption of a neat 
cleavage between access-controlling and use-controlling DRM—this exemption 
borders on the silly. I doubt it has ever been used. 
97 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(f), 1201(g)(2). 
98 Id. §1201(g). 
99 Id. § 1201(a)(1). 
100 Herman & Gandy, supra note 60, at 143-44. 
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are heavily stacked against proposed exemptions.101 Changes 
introduced in the 2006 rulemaking make it somewhat less 
objectionable in terms of both procedure and outcome, though the 
whole procedure remains deeply flawed.102 
Ironically, the bill’s opponents might have been better off 
had they allowed the original bill to pass without the explicit 
exemptions that were later added. As Jessica Litman explains: 
 
The original Lehman bill granted copyright owners 
sweeping new rights, but its silence on available exceptions 
invited the courts to apply copyright’s traditional 
limitations [such as fair use]. The DMCA also grants 
copyright owners sweeping new rights. Its laundry list of 
narrow exceptions, however, discourages the inference that 
the classic general exceptions and privileges apply.103 
 
This inapplicability of general exceptions became the cause for 
much political wrangling later, as discussed below. 
C. DMCA: Impact and Political Significance 
Compared with the AHRA, the passage of the DMCA 
represented a much more significant shift in copyright law as a 
vehicle for the regulation of technology. The AHRA regulates only 
one small class of technologies—stand-alone digital audio 
recording devices. In contrast, the DMCA regulates a potentially 
infinite number of devices, including computers. Every 
copyrighted work that can be digitized can be wrapped in 
encryption and flagged by copyright management information. 
Those who design and manipulate technologies to handle such 
copyrighted works are on thin legal ice. This discourages even 
legitimate academic encryption research, despite the exception for 
encryption research.104 Unauthorized but legal uses of DRM-
protected works are also discouraged, both by the ban on 
circumvention and the ban on tools of circumvention.105 This is a 
                                                
101 Id. at 187-90. 
102 Bill D. Herman, Copyright Office Grants 6 Exemptions for Circumventing 
TPMs, SHOUTING LOUDLY, Nov. 22, 2006, 
http://www.shoutingloudly.com/2006/11/22/copyright-office-grants-6-
exemptions-for-circumventing-tpms. 
103 LITMAN, supra note 58, at 145. 
104 KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 261-62 (2001). 
105 Herman & Gandy, supra note 60, at 132. 
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substantial departure from prior copyright law, sharing “neither the 
logic nor the strategy of copyright.”106  
Like the debate around the AHRA, the process leading up 
to the DMCA also says a great deal about the politics of 
copyright—though while the AHRA debate was more of an 
extension of the previous politics of copyright, the run-up to the 
DMCA sowed the seeds of a major change. Before Lehman began 
advancing his ideas, there was still no cohort of policy actors that 
advanced an agenda directly opposed to that of the SC coalition. 
Lehman’s proposal, however, scared opponents into coordinated 
action. Starting with Peter Jaszi and other like-minded law 
professors, opponents began recruiting others to the cause in the 
hopes of stopping or amending the proposal before it could become 
law. Importantly, they successfully recruited new coalition 
members that policymakers could not ignore—that is, not just law 
professors and librarians—including especially industry groups. 
Weighing in to express concerns about the bill were computer and 
electronics industry trade groups such as the Home Recording 
Rights Coalition, Consumer Electronics Manufacturers 
Association, and the Computer & Communications Industry 
Association. Another notable opponent was the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which functions like an 
academic body and has many academic members but is also 
substantially populated by and representative of industry 
professionals. With the AHRA debate being just the most recent 
example, Congress was not used to legislating copyright law in the 
face of opposing industries. The addition of genuinely opposed 
industries slowed down what Lehman expected would be easy 
passage for the bill. 
Another important development was when Representative 
Rick Boucher joined the opposition. Over nearly three decades in 
service, Boucher earned a reputation as one of the most 
technologically literate member of Congress and an informed, 
thoughtful voice in technology policy discussions.107 In expressing 
his own views in congressional hearings, he eloquently advanced 
the arguments of the bill’s opponents. For instance, he argued that 
the bill would erode the Sony decision and that this would prevent 
legitimate technologies from coming to market.108 He also 
                                                
106 GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 177. 
107 Tony Romm, Tech Community Laments Rick Boucher Loss, POLITICO, Nov. 
2, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44589.html. 
108 NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
16 (1996) (statement of Hon. Rep. Rick Boucher). 
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proposed legislation with an alternate version of § 1201.109 It read, 
in part: 
 
No person, for the purpose of facilitating or 
engaging in an act of infringement, shall engage in 
conduct so as knowingly to remove, deactivate or 
otherwise circumvent the application or operation of 
any effective technological measure used by a 
copyright owner to preclude or limit reproduction of 
a work or a portion thereof. As used in this 
subsection, the term ‘conduct’ does not include 
manufacturing, importing or distributing a device or 
a computer program.110 
 
If passed in this form, the DMCA would have tethered violations 
to the question of infringement; if a user’s purpose was not 
infringing, circumvention would have been entirely legal. Thus, 
exemptions and affirmative defenses such as fair use would have 
limited the reach of the DMCA. In this bill, the basic ban is the 
only ban—there are no bans on developing or selling products or 
services that circumvent DRM, whether access controlling or use-
controlling. Instead, the language specifically exempts 
manufacturers and vendors of such devices and services. Unlike 
the DMCA that passed, the Boucher proposal would not have 
limited the reach of the Sony defense.  
Obviously, members of Congress make for powerful 
political allies, and this represents Boucher’s full-throated entrée 
into the coalition opposed to copyright as a tool for regulating 
technology. Combined with the academic, librarian, and many 
technology industry actors111 organized under the aegis of the 
Digital Future Coalition, this group now had a collective voice that 
represented substantial opposition that needed to be taken 
seriously. Because this coalition sprung into existence in response 
to Lehman’s proposals, the bill’s proponents were caught off-guard 
and needed to regroup. Fortunately for them, the WIPO treaties 
gave additional momentum to the proposal, and it passed anyway. 
The SC coalition won passage of one part of the DMCA 
with remarkable ease. The DMCA contains a little-noticed, 
AHRA-like affirmative requirement that all VCRs sold in the U.S. 
implement a specific DRM technology.112 The technology, 
developed by DRM vendor Macrovision, looks for a “do not copy” 
                                                
109 Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 8 (1997). 
110 Id. §1201(a). 
111 The various divisions of the technology sector are not unified on these issues. 
See infra Part IV.B. 
112 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k). 
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signal that movie studies can build into pre-recorded videos; if the 
signal is present, the VCR will not make a useful copy of the 
original. This provision was subject to no public scrutiny. Nothing 
like this section appeared in the versions that passed the House and 
the Senate; rather, it was “added during conference committee 
markup.”113 Thus, this AHRA-like mandate, of obvious benefit to 
Macrovision and also desired by the movie industry, was passed 
using a strategy designed to evade public input. 
The most significant part of the anti-circumvention 
provisions, however, was and remains the three bans on 
circumvention and trafficking in circumvention devices. The law’s 
passage was a wake-up call to those in the formerly cozy confines 
of the copyright debate. It saw the birth of the SFU coalition and 
its capacity to slow and even modify copyright industry-backed 
legislation. The SFU coalition was not yet powerful enough to stop 
the DMCA from passage, but catching Lehman off-guard and 
changing the bill was a promising beginning. In the years after, 
opposition to the DMCA became one of the main issues driving 
the growth of the SFU coalition. Before considering the efforts to 
reform the DMCA, however, the intervening years are worth brief 
consideration. 
III. INTERLUDE: 1999 TO 2002 
In the four years between the passage of the DMCA and the 
next major legislative fights over credibly advanced DRM 
proposals, several notable events happened that reshaped the 
playing field. The most visible events happened in technology and 
the courts, but some less widely discussed developments from that 
period have had comparable or even greater long-term political 
significance. 
A. The Peer-to-Peer Explosion 
Most visibly, 1999 was the year in which Napster first gave 
millions of users the ability to acquire nearly all of the world’s 
recorded music for free. This represented a tectonic shift in the 
media industry; suddenly, the music industry wished that its 
biggest threat were from illicit cassette recordings (digital or 
otherwise) rather than the Internet. Most readers will likely know 
at least the basics of the story, though of course there are more 
thorough examinations of the birth and early growth of Napster,114 
                                                
113 Herman & Gandy, supra note 60, n.146. 
114 ALDERMAN, supra note 52. 
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the record industry’s reaction,115 and the current state of the music 
industry in light of peer-to-peer (P2P) trading.116 
Even during hearings leading up to the DMCA, the media 
industries were already expressing fears about the Internet.117 If the 
untamed web of 1998 was scary, however, the explosive adoption 
of peer-to-peer software was mortifying. The record industry 
responded with a multi-pronged legal strategy. First, along with the 
motion picture industry, they sued the companies behind P2P 
technologies. They started by suing Napster, winning a finding that 
the company was liable for its users’ widespread infringement.118 
After the 2001 Napster decision led to the service’s shuttering, 
several newer companies sprung up to fill Napster’s shoes; the 
recording and movie industries responded by suing these 
companies as well, resulting in the 2005 Grokster decision by the 
Supreme Court.119 This decision substantially reduced the value of 
the Sony safe harbor, placing technology innovators in a much 
more precarious legal position.120 Yet this strategy did not prevent 
the further development and adoption of still further P2P 
programs.121 “In short, suing the technology hasn’t worked,”122 as 
P2P software is still readily available and widely used for 
infringement. 
The other part of the RIAA’s legal strategy was suing 
thousands of users—approximately 35,000 from 2003 to 2008.123 It 
                                                
115 STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE SPECTACULAR 
CRASH OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
116 See, e.g., MARY MADDEN, THE STATE OF MUSIC ONLINE: TEN YEARS AFTER 
NAPSTER (2009), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The-State-of-Music-
Online_-Ten-Years-After-Napster.pdf.  
117 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights: The Music and Film Industry: Hearing 
Before the  Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on Int’l 
Relations, 105th Cong. 26 (1998) (statement of Steven Metalitz, Vice President 
and General Counsel, International Intellectual Property Association) (“One 
thing that we’re very concerned about is that technology is driving this problem 
to get worse. The . . . internet and other networks give the copyright industries 
new ways of reaching new customers and new markets. But these very same 
technologies magnify the threat of piracy.”). 
118 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
119 MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
120 Menell & Nimmer, supra note 14. 
121 The most significant contemporary P2P application is BitTorrent, which is 
used for widespread infringement but also has been adopted for legitimate 
purposes such as distributing open source software. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (2008), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.  
122 Id. at 2. 
123 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, 
WALL ST. J, Dec. 19, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html. 
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was a public relations debacle, highlighted by lawsuits against 
“several single mothers, a dead person and a 13-year-old girl.”124 
While the RIAA certainly embarked on this campaign with some 
reluctance and with a readiness to be subjected to some degree of 
public scorn, the suits did not even have the intended effect of 
discouraging P2P use.125 The message that illicit P2P trading is 
illegal did get through to users, but peer pressure provided a far 
more powerful force in favor of continued use.126 Beginning in 
2008, the RIAA thus stopped pursuing new cases, though it 
continued with cases that had already begun.127 
Even though the RIAA has stopped suing users and even 
scaled back its scorched-earth litigation against technological 
innovators, the group may never recover from the public relations 
damage. After its response to Napster, the trade group that had 
formerly had relatively little public visibility was suddenly the 
object of hatred by young people and technology enthusiasts across 
the country. While few of these people were being tapped for 
direct political action, their opposition to the RIAA’s political 
agenda was suddenly boundless and effusive.128 Even among the 
very substantial subset that do not trade illicit files, there has been 
little public support for the industry in its war against downloaders. 
This ethos of visceral resentment toward the RIAA and MPAA has 
also been reflected on and fueled by virtually every major 
technology website—from Wired to technology-themed blogs and 
user-generated content sites. On the rare occasions when high-
profile sites do host a guest commentary from an SC ally, the 
stream of outraged user comments let the editors know that this 
                                                
124 Id. 
125 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 121, at 9. (“Is it working? . . . After five 
years of threats and litigation, the answer is a resounding no.”)  
126 Ville Oksanen & Mikko Välimäki, Theory of Deterrence and Individual 
Behavior: Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?, 3 REV. OF LAW 
& ECON. 693, 693 (2007), available at 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2007.3.3/rle.2007.3.3.1156/rle.2007.3.3. 
1156.xml?format=INT.  
127 McBride & Smith, supra note 123. 
128 On literally every major site that I can name that draws the young or 
technology savvy, open contempt for content industry lobbyists has been the 
norm since these lawsuits began. The drumbeat is the loudest on technology 
sites, such as Slashdot.org, Wired.com, TechDirt.com, and Gizmodo.com, where 
the legal environment for technology is discussed with the highest relative 
frequency. On other sites are popular with young audiences—such as YouTube 
and social networking sites such as MySpace (dominant during the heart of the 
RIAA’s legal campaign) and Facebook—the subject comes up with much less 
proportional frequency, but when it does, users are more openly hostile to the 
RIAA than sympathetic to their goals. 
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viewpoint is not appreciated.129 While the DMCA had passed in 
relative obscurity, the RIAA’s actions quickly pushed copyright to 
the front page—while drawing millions to view the content 
industry as the enemy in a war between new technologies and 
copyright holders. 
B. Senator Hollings’s Proposal 
Not content with the DMCA, the content industries and 
their allies in Congress soon advanced additional legislative 
proposals intended to limit Internet users’ ability to continue 
engaging in infringement. The most significant of these legislative 
proposals, if enacted, would have represented a change in 
copyright exceeding the significance even of the DMCA. That 
proposal, S. 2048, the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television 
Promotion Act,130 “would have prohibited the manufacture, sale, 
import, or provision of any ‘interactive digital media device’ that 
didn’t incorporate certain security technologies.”131 From 
computers to iPods to a good portion of today’s advanced home 
audio/video equipment, the bill would have required government-
specified copy protection to be built into each device. 
Sponsored by Senator Fritz Hollings, S. 2048 created a 
firestorm. “Several consumer groups and electronics companies 
aligned themselves against” the bill.132 A Salon headline warned, 
“U.S. Prepares to Invade Your Hard Drive,” and noted that 
Hollings’ sponsorship of the bill had moved him into the “axis of 
evil for technology.”133 Faced with this coordinated—and now 
predictable—resistance, the bill was unlikely ever to become law. 
As if this were not enough of an obstacle, the Hollings bill also ran 
into a problem of committee jurisdiction; by introducing this bill 
from the Senate Commerce Committee, Hollings stepped squarely 
on the Judiciary Committee’s traditional domain of copyright 
legislation. This breach of jurisdiction upset Judiciary member 
                                                
129 For instance, in 2005, CNET published an anti-DMCA-reform piece by 
Patrick Ross, then-VP of the now-defunct SC-aligned Progress and Freedom 
Foundation. Patrick Ross, Perspective: Here’s a Surefire Way to Stifle 
Innovation, CNET NEWS (Oct. 6, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/2010-1025_3-
5889596.html. The article drew 124 comments, virtually all of them scathing 
critiques—including one by this author.  
130 Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
131 GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 196. 
132 Brad King, Howling Mad Over Hollings' Bill, WIRED, Mar. 3, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/ 
gadgets/portablemusic/news/2002/03/51337?currentPage=all. 
133 Paul Boutin, U.S. Prepares to Invade Your Hard Drive, SALON, Mar. 29, 
2002, http://www. salon.com/2002/03/29/hollings_bill/. 
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Patrick Leahy, who is normally a reliable supporter of copyright 
industry requests but in this case actually threatened a filibuster.134 
If the music and movie industries had wanted to give 
something like the Hollings bill a real shot at passage, they would 
have engaged the electronics and computer industries in the kind of 
negotiations that led to the passage of the AHRA. They also would 
have chosen the “right” committee to introduce the bill. Instead, 
Disney’s then-CEO Michael Eisner, reportedly the industry voice 
who led to Hollings’ sponsorship of the bill,135 jumped several 
steps ahead in the process and moved forward with a sponsor that 
further reduced the odds of passage. There are a range of theories 
about why Eisner and Hollings teamed up on this effort, all the 
more so because the Hollings bill would have gone further than 
even other media companies and allied congresspersons 
supported,136 meaning that the strategies they did choose sealed the 
bill’s fate. 
Rather than a sincere effort to change the law, the Hollings 
bill was far more likely intended as a rhetorical move—an addition 
to the conversation or an implicit threat to the technology sector, 
depending on one’s perspective. It was reported as an effort to spur 
“Hollywood and Silicon Valley to redouble their efforts to find a 
technological fix to the problem of digital duplication. . . . In other 
words, think of Washington as a legislative cattle prod.”137 One 
could debate whether this prod was effective or counterproductive, 
though there is no clear link to any industry outcomes. The next 
April, Apple finally offered consumers a legitimate way to 
purchase most big-label music—contained within Apple’s 
proprietary DRM scheme, FairPlay—with the iTunes Music Store. 
Many other stores soon cropped up selling their own packages of 
DRM-wrapped media. Yet it is not at all clear that the Hollings bill 
helped foster any of these outcomes. Instead, it took Apple—and 
even, to a large degree, Steve Jobs personally—to persuade a 
reluctant recording industry to embrace Internet distribution.138 
Once the money started rolling in from that agreement, deals with 
other companies became far more conceivable. 
                                                




135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Ben Sisario, He Pushed a Reluctant Industry Toward Digital Music, N.Y. 
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The Hollings bill did at least serve as a loud and clear threat 
to the technology industry: Make DRM systems that satisfy the 
content companies, or Congress might design and mandate one for 
you. It also made it quite clear to technology companies that they 
needed to pay more attention to the debate over copyright in DC.139 
This is especially significant because the technology sector is not 
united on copyright issues. Some are principled, permanent 
members of the SFU coalition; the clearest examples are nonprofits 
that support free (as in freedom) software and other copyrightable 
content, such as the Free Software Foundation (founded in 1985), 
the Mozilla project (created in 1998), and the Wikimedia 
Foundation (founded in 2003). In contrast, the commercial 
software industry (in particular, Microsoft and Adobe) and vendors 
of DRM technologies (e.g., Macrovision) are generally members 
of the SC coalition. The rest of the technology sector generally 
leans toward the SFU position but are better described as the 
“persuadable technology” (or PT) division or group. This 
division—which I do not label as a coalition since they do not 
necessarily act in coordination—is filled with very important 
potential allies for either the SC or the SFU coalition. Those in the 
PT group include the consumer electronics industry, makers of 
computer hardware, Internet service providers, web content 
companies, and online retailers. Collectively, these represent a 
significantly larger share of the economy than the SC-affiliated 
industries,140 allowing them a real chance to swing the debate in 
either direction. 
                                                
139 See Birnbaum, supra note 134. 
140 In 2009, the latest year available, the entire publishing industry (including 
software) accounted for 1% of GDP, and the movie and record industries made 
up just 0.4%. The SC coalition could also claim a portion of the “Arts, 
entertainment, and recreation” sector—particularly that portion, such as sports 
leagues, that also sell their rights to media companies—that totals 0.9%. In 
contrast, the computer and electronics industry alone made up 1.5%, and the 
sales of these items are a substantial and lucrative portion of the retail (5.8%) 
and wholesale (5.5%) trade sectors. (For instance, the items that draw the largest 
crowds for Black Friday sales are almost always technology products, including 
televisions, computers, and video game systems.) The IT services sector 
(“Computer systems design and related services”) accounted for 1.2%, 
information processing came in at 0.5%, and telecommunications and 
broadcasting (unfortunately lumped together) accounted for 2.5%. Depending on 
estimates for the telecommunications industry (vs. broadcasting) and impact on 
wholesale and retail trade, the PT division in the copyright debate could claim 
credit for 5% to 10% of the U.S. economy. In contrast, the SC sectors might 
weigh in at 3% to 5%. In other words, the PT division is roughly twice as large 
as all SC-affiliated industries, and as much as ten times as large as the industries 
at the very core of the SC coalition—the record and movie industries. See Teresa 
L. Gilmore, Edward T. Morgan, & Sarah B. Osborne, Annual Industry 
Accounts: Advance Statistics on GDP by Industry for 2010, SURV. OF CURRENT 
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The bulk of the technology industry is persuadable on 
issues of digital copyright regulation. If proposed copyright 
legislation would drastically reduce consumer rights in a way that 
would sharply reduce the value of their wares, they will weigh in 
alongside the SFU coalition. Yet, as discussed herein in relation to 
the AHRA (§ II), DMCA (§ III), and broadcast flag (§ VI), they 
are also willing to go along with increases in copyright as long as 
they can shape the legislation such that it reduces their liability or 
does not substantially reduce their profitability. Because of their 
substantial economic clout, the SFU and SC coalitions each spend 
a great deal of effort trying to draw this PT division to support 
their respective sides. To the extent the Hollings bill—as well as 
the suits against P2P companies—pushed the PT division closer to 
the SFU coalition, it probably had the ironic effect of harming the 
SC coalition’s interests. Regardless of whether its impact led to 
any actual business decisions, then, the bill’s political significance 
is hard to ignore. 
C. NGOs Take a Central Role 
In addition to rousing the slumbering giant of the 
technology sector, aggressive copyright industry litigation and 
lobbying helped spark the permanent involvement of nonprofit 
groups. Leading up to the passage of the DMCA, the Internet and 
media policy NGOs had little to say by way of opposition. The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which was founded in 1990 
as roughly the online equivalent of the ACLU, could have joined 
as an opponent of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions. 
Instead, in 1995, the Washington Post quoted then-chair Esther 
Dyson as supporting Lehman’s proposal.141 The Digital Future 
Coalition was really just an umbrella group for other actors, and it 
was conceived, founded, and run by people who had day jobs other 
than as full-time policy advocates. While this was an important 
start, there were no NGOs dedicated to the public’s side in the 
copyright debate. 
In the early 2000s, however—especially in 2001—NGOs 
got heavily involved, and computer science researchers became the 
cause célèbre that helped spur such heavy involvement. First, in 
2001, a team of computer scientists at Princeton faced legal threats 
for their study of a DRM system then in development. The Secure 
                                                                                                         
BUSINESS 8, 17 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2011/05%20May/0511_indy_accts.pdf. 
141 Elizabeth Corcoran, A Digital Duel: Whose Property Is This? Business and 
the ‘Net Cruisers Debate How—and Whether—Copyright Applies in 
Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at H1. 
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Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), a coalition of recording industry 
and technology firms, was developing the DRM system, and the 
RIAA caught the researchers utterly off-guard with surprisingly 
stark legal threats. Lawrence Lessig tells the story: 
 
Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a 
standard that would allow the content owner to say 
“this music cannot be copied,” and have a computer 
respect that command. The technology was to be 
part of a “trusted system” of control that would get 
content owners to trust the system of the Internet 
much more. 
When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, 
it set up a competition. In exchange for providing 
contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit 
of content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if 
they did, report the problems to the consortium. 
[Princeton Professor Ed] Felten and his team 
figured out the encryption system quickly. He and 
the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: 
Many encryption systems would suffer the same 
weakness, and Felten and his team thought it 
worthwhile to point this out to those who study 
encryption. 
. . . 
And though an academic paper describing the 
weakness in a system of encryption should . . . be 
perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an 
RIAA lawyer that [threatened legal action].142  
 
The RIAA invoked the DMCA in its threats to Felten’s team. Of 
course, it is a rare event when scholars are threatened with legal 
action for attempting to share their research results at an academic 
conference. This drew substantial publicity—and much of it 
negative—for the DMCA. The researchers were able to attract 
substantial donations of money, pro bono legal work, and 
favorable publicity to support their case, all of which led the SDMI 
attorneys to drop the suit—though not before the ordeal wreaked 
professional havoc for the researchers.143 The Electronic Frontier 
                                                
142 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 155-57 
(2004). Even though the researchers won in the end, they endured tremendous 
professional difficulties. 
143 See, e.g., Ed Felten, Happy Endings, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Apr. 28, 2006), 
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/happy-endings. Felten writes: 
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Foundation, which had not previously been a major player in 
copyright politics, went to work pro bono on Felten’s behalf. The 
EFF gave Felten’s team the kind of legal and public relations 
resources that led the RIAA to drop its suit.144 Even after the 
immediate legal threat was withdrawn, Felten and the EFF still 
wanted a court precedent to create a legal umbrella over his 
research and work like it, so they filed a suit seeking such a ruling. 
Since the recording industry had backed down, however, the New 
Jersey Federal District Court dismissed the case, and Felten’s side 
declined to pursue an appeal.145 
 Also in 2001, Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov faced 
his own, even more serious legal problems. During a visit to the 
United States, he was arrested and jailed for nearly a month, 
charged with criminal violations of the DMCA. Sklyarov was a 
PhD student researching cryptography and an employee of Russian 
software firm Elcomsoft. He had helped create a program called 
the Advanced eBook Processor, which removed the restrictions in 
Adobe Systems’ eBook software. After he gave a presentation 
about the software at the 2001 DEF CON hacker146 convention in 
Las Vegas, FBI agents arrested him and charged him with 
trafficking in a circumvention device for profit, a criminal offense 
under § 1204. After several weeks in jail, Sklyarov was released on 
                                                                                                         
Let's catalog the happy consequences of our case. One person lost his 
job, and another nearly did. Countless hours of pro bono lawyer time were 
consumed. Anonymous donors gave up large amounts of money to support 
our defense. I lost at least months of my professional life, and other 
colleagues did too. And after all this, the ending was that we were able to 
publish our work – something which, before the DMCA, we would have 
been able to do with no trouble at all. 
In the end, yes, we were happy – in the same way one is happy to 
recover from food poisoning. Which is not really an argument in favor of 
food poisoning. 
Id. 
144 Jennifer B. Lee, Delayed Report on Encryption Flaws to Be Presented, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at C3 (“Dr. Felten says the association changed its stance 
only after the researchers filed the lawsuit in June with the support of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation . . . .”). 
145 Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Security Researchers Drop 
Scientific Censorship Case: Government, Industry Claim DMCA Not a Threat 
to Science (Feb. 6, 2002), available at 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20020206_eff_felten_pr.html. 
146 News media often portray hackers as people who use their technological 
skills to commit crimes. As used here and as represented at DEF CON, a 
“hacker” is better thought of as a tinkerer. As the DEF CON web page notes, 
there are indeed criminals at the convention. Of course, criminals “also go to 
high school, college, work in your workplace, and the government. There are 
also lawyers, law enforcement agents, civil libertarians, cryptographers, and 
hackers in attendance [at DEF CON]. Ssshhh. Don't tell anyone.” Official DEF 
CON FAQ v0.95, DEFCON.ORG, https://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-faq/dc-
faq.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
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the condition that he testify against his employer Elcomsoft. In 
2002, the jury found the company not guilty; they believed the 
company’s defense of not knowingly violating the law.147 Again, 
the EFF worked on behalf of the defendant, and again they were 
able to leverage the case into substantial negative publicity against 
the DMCA. While the EFF had not previously been involved in 
copyright litigation or advocacy to any substantial degree, the 
Felten and Sklyarov cases drew them immediately into the very 
center of the fray. As I discuss elsewhere, this entry was not 
temporary, but is still reflected by their central place in the 
copyright debate.148 
Likewise, in 2001, the D.C.-based NGO Public Knowledge 
was born.149 The group was founded largely to serve as a 
permanent D.C. presence to counterbalance the content industry’s 
lobbying efforts—or, as they put it more positively on their site, 
the group “preserves the openness of the Internet and the public's 
access to knowledge, promotes creativity through balanced 
copyright, and upholds and protects the rights of consumers to use 
innovative technology lawfully.”150 As discussed elsewhere,151 
Public Knowledge plays an absolutely central role in the SFU 
coalition’s DC presence. During congressional hearings on 
copyright, they are often the only NGO present. By 2002, Public 
Knowledge President Gigi Sohn was already appearing in the 
national media as a voice for moderation in copyright law.152 
D. Scholars Step into the Spotlight 
Finally, the period from 1999 to 2002 was the beginning of 
a period of major public outreach by scholars. Peter Jaszi might 
have put the Digital Future Coalition in motion, but most outside 
the world of copyright are (unfortunately for them) not familiar 
                                                
147 Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared of Illegal Software Sales, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/business/technology-russian-company-
cleared-of-illegal-software-sales.html. 
148 Herman, supra note 16. 
149 Public Knowledge, RAZOO, http://www.razoo.com/story/Publicknowledge 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
150 Our Work, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, http://publicknowledge.org (last visited Oct. 
28, 2011). 
151 See HERMAN, supra note 19, at 87, 175, 213. 
152 E.g., David Lieberman, Reshaping Industries, Lifestyles, USA TODAY, June 
25, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2002/06/25/bonus-
panel.htm; Amy Harmon, Movie Studios Press Congress in Digital Copyright 
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with Jaszi or with the other key scholars who were the heart of the 
DFC.153 In sharp contrast, by the early 2000s, law professor 
Lawrence Lessig had appeared in public so often that he became 
known to millions as the face of a growing movement to reform 
copyright. He published several books aimed at non-lawyers,154 
helping to raise a high degree of public consciousness around 
questions of Internet design and regulation. Lessig also served as 
the attorney for Eric Eldred in Eldred’s eponymous case, argued in 
2002 and decided in 2003.155 They asked the Supreme Court to 
overturn the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act,156 which 
extended copyright terms by 20 years—even retroactively. They 
failed to get their desired ruling, but the case helped bring 
additional attention to the fair use coalition’s message on copyright 
law.157 While Lessig’s role has been singular, many other scholars 
have also taken the SFU coalition’s message to the public—not 
only legal scholars,158 but also scholars in fields such as 
communication159 and computer science.160 Once copyright 
                                                
153 This is not to say that these scholars were not public intellectuals. For 
instance, in congressional hearings leading up to the DMCA, law professors 
James Boyle, Robert L. Oakley, and Keith Aoki testified against the bill—as did 
Douglas Bennett, a political scientist who was then the president of Earlham 
College. Further, over 60 law faculty signed letters urging Congress to strip the 
portions of the bill that ban circumvention devices, instead calling for a conduct-
based approach much more like Boucher’s proposal. (Titles, dates, page 
numbers, and full PDFs of the hearings on file with author.) To my knowledge, 
however, none engaged in the kind of full-frontal publicity campaign that would 
come a few years later. 
154 Lessig’s early triumvirate of bestsellers is: CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999); THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2002); and FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY (2004). 
155 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
156 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998). 
157 See, e.g., Dan Ackman, 0.2% for the Mouse!, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2003, at 
A10; Copyrights and Wrongs, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at A24; Amy 
Harmon, The Supreme Court: The Context; A Corporate Victory, but One That 
Raises Public Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/16/us/supreme-court-context-corporate-
victory-but-one-that-raises-public-consciousness.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
158 There are so many public intellectuals at law schools whose work includes 
this issue that I dare not name a selection of them. For a starting point—but not 
anywhere near a definitive list—one could look at the list of faculty affiliated 
with Harvard’s Berkman Center on Internet and Society. 
159 Two early examples are Siva Vaidhyanathan (then at N.Y.U., now at 
Virginia) and Kembrew McLeod (Iowa), though more have joined them in the 
years since. 
160 Without setting out to do so, Ed Felten became one of the most visible 
political actors in his discipline after the RIAA’s legal threats. In the last decade, 
Felten founded the technology policy blog Freedom-to-Tinker.com as well as 
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became a hot issue—especially, as in Ed Felten’s case, once it 
became a hot issue in some researchers’ laps—these scholars were 
happy to help spread the agenda of copyright moderation, not only 
writing volumes online, but also appearing in newspapers and on 
radio and TV news.  
The combination of all these events turned the period from 
1999 to 2002 into an inflection point in the history of copyright. 
Before that point, copyright was perceived as a topic of little 
interest to the general public, but the subject suddenly captured the 
public’s attention.161 For a brief window, it seemed like the 
Internet might destroy the media industry’s business model of 
large, centralized distribution systems; the future of music, movies, 
publishing, and news media seemed to hang in the balance. Digital 
utopians like John Perry Barlow promised that the Internet would 
remove the need for centralized media industries and for copyright 
protection in general.162 Meanwhile, some agreed with Barlow’s 
contention in fact, but took up a wholly different estimation of that 
outcome’s desirability—promising doom and gloom for the future 
of cultural creativity.163 In hindsight, the debate of ten years ago 
seems radically overstated, but at the time, many believed we had 
to choose between continued Internet freedom and the continued 
existence of the entertainment industries. While the same tension 
remains today, and though Manichean rhetoric is still not hard to 
find, everyone knows the policy trade-off between digital freedom 
and industry profits are a matter of degree rather than an either-or 
                                                                                                         
Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy. On January 1, 2011, 
Felten became the Chief Technologist of the Federal Trade Commission. The 
irony here is that recording industry threats against Felten turned him into a 
powerful opponent.  
161 Siva Vaidhyanathan, The State of Copyright Activism, FIRST MONDAY, Apr. 
5, 2004, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_4/siva/index.html. 
162 John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas: Will Copyright Survive the 
Napster Bomb? Nope, But Creativity Will, WIRED, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/download_pr.html (last visited Apr. 
4, 2012). 
163 See, e.g., David Higgins, Download and Be Damned, SYDNEY MORNING 




9_8726. (“THE Internet generation is holding the rock industry to ransom with 
computer programs which let it steal whole CDs at the click of a mouse.”). But 
see Sathnam Sanghera, Battles of the Copyright Crusader: Interview Hilary 
Rosen, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at 10 (quoting then-RIAA chair Hilary 
Rosen, “I don't think it's the end of the business—every survey that we've ever 
done says that music is an incredibly important part of people's lives, 
consumption of music is still extremely high—we just have to monetise that 
more effectively and find better ways of getting piracy under control. We will 
return to growth.”). 
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choice. One good example of this later debate was the proposal to 
reform the DMCA. 
IV. DMCA REFORM 
 Especially in light of the Felten and Sklyarov cases, the 
budding SFU coalition quickly came to see the DMCA as an 
extremely objectionable law in need of reform. The stories of 
programmers who had been harassed and even jailed quickly 
galvanized academics, programmers, and inventors, adding 
thousands to the ranks of the newly or potentially mobilized. While 
the Felten and Sklyarov cases are just part of the DMCA reform 
movement’s story—and efforts to reform the DMCA are just part 
of the intellectual property reform movement—these two stories 
served as a mobilizing wake-up call for untold thousands of new 
entrants into the copyright debate. 
A. Reform Proposals 
 DMCA reform became a serious possibility once it 
attracted congressional allies. Most significant of these was 
Representative Rick Boucher, Democrat of Virginia. In the 108th 
and 109th Congresses, he introduced bills to curtail the reach of the 
DMCA.164 Also in the 108th Congress, Representative Zoe 
Lofgren, Democrat of California, introduced a similar DMCA 
reform bill, cosponsored by Boucher.165 These bills would have 
modified the basic ban on circumventing copy controls, allowing 
circumvention to aid otherwise legal activities such as fair use. 
They also would have scaled back the anti-trafficking provisions, 
allowing companies to develop and sell tools with substantial 
noninfringing uses. In short, the bills would have tethered charges 
of illegal circumvention to charges of infringement, and they 
would have applied the Sony standard166 to the development and 
distribution of tools capable of circumvention. Like Sony’s 
Betamax video recorder, companies would be able to develop 
                                                
164 See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. 
(2003); see also Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
165 See Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer 
Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003). 
166 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984) (finding “the sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute 
contributory infringement if the product is . . . capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”).  
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circumvention devices that are capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses. 
 The DMCA would be quite different if such a reform 
passed. For instance, the law would still forbid hacking DVDs en 
route to selling bootlegged copies; in addition to the civil and 
criminal penalties for infringement, a would-be bootlegger could 
also face the DMCA’s civil and criminal penalties. If reformed as 
Boucher envisioned, however, the DMCA would not prevent a 
consumer from hacking the DRM on a legally purchased DVD to 
transfer the film to her laptop—an activity that is illegal if common 
today. 
 Technology firms could also develop and sell 
circumvention devices under such a reform, as long as these tools 
were capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Since DRM 
systems generally prevent some noninfringing uses,167 most 
circumvention tools are likely capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses. This would have been quite a legal shield for would-be 
makers of circumvention devices, spreading the tools to 
circumvent DRM from the dark corners of the Internet into the 
open—and even on to the shelves of big box retailers. 
If these reforms had passed, the DMCA would be less 
frightening for the likes of Ed Felten and Dmitry Sklyarov. Legal 
threats against encryption researchers would be less frequent and 
less likely to succeed. This might not be enough to comfort 
researchers, however. Indeed, given the current law’s exemption 
for encryption research,168 Felten likely would have prevailed had 
the RIAA actually sued—rather than merely threatening a suit. Yet 
that is little comfort for an individual in the face of a legal threat 
from a major industry trade group. Since the court’s dismissal of 
Felten’s suit, no researcher has faced similar legal threats for 
academic encryption research. If passed, the reform would further 
increase any such researcher’s odds of success in court, but even 
the threat of a suit is often enough to chill certain activities. As 
Felten explains, “For me and my colleagues, probably wasn't 
enough. Even a 99% chance of getting to keep our houses and 
savings wasn't enough. Nor should it be.”169  
If the potential difference for academic researchers is 
important but small, the impact of such a reform on for-profit 
activities would be enormous. The difference would be night and 
day for somebody in Sklyarov’s situation—researching encryption 
for academic purposes and turning this knowledge into a 
marketable product. A firm like Elcomsoft would be much better 
                                                
167 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 74-75 (2008). 
168 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 
169 Ed Felten, Revisionism, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Aug. 5, 2003), 
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/revisionism. 
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positioned to take calculated risks in this circumstance, and while 
the law might still prevent some technologies from coming to 
market, the odds would be much more favorable to technology 
firms and thus to their employees. 
From the perspective of the SC coalition, the proposed 
reforms would substantially reduce their ability to use the DMCA 
to keep circumvention devices on the margins. Hundreds of 
thousands if not millions of people download and use software that 
circumvents DRM; as of this writing, the most common goal is to 
defeat the encryption on DVDs (and, increasingly, Blu-Ray discs), 
but many other DRM systems are routinely targeted. Many other 
consumers, however, do not even know that such options exist. For 
many, circumvention devices such as DVD rippers are effectively 
unavailable until they appear in mainstream retail stores—if Best 
Buy does not sell it, it does not exist. Keeping circumvention tools 
out of these less technology-savvy consumers’ hands may indeed 
preserve some revenue for the content industries.170 
B. Outcome and Significance 
DMCA reform garnered serious attention and support from 
virtually every significant member of the SFU coalition, and it 
drew substantial opposition from the SC coalition. The House 
Committee on Commerce and Energy held several hearings to 
discuss the bills in detail.171 Further, in the 109th Congress (2005-
2006), the bill’s 13 bipartisan cosponsors included House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce Chair Joe Barton, giving it 
instant credibility.172 
While the kerfuffle over the Hollings bill revealed the 
judiciary committees’ belief that they should get first crack at 
copyright issues, the commerce committees—who have 
jurisdiction over the regulation of consumer goods such as 
electronics—also have a legitimate role to play once copyright 
becomes a tool for regulating technology. This opens the door to 
venue shopping for both sides. In general, the judiciary committees 
have been quite hospitable to the SC coalition, while the commerce 
committees have proven friendlier to the technology industries and 
                                                
170 In particular, children’s movies undoubtedly sell many extra copies because 
many parents don’t know how to make backup copies—leaving them to pay full 
price to replace copies that got lost, damaged, or smeared with jam. See CORY 
DOCTOROW, CONTENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY, CREATIVITY, 
COPYRIGHT, AND THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURE 8-9 (2008), available at 
http://craphound.com/content/download/.  
171 HERMAN, supra note 19, at 200. 
172 Id. at 170. 
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thus more skeptical of DRM regulation. Barton’s chairmanship 
sharpened this divide. 
Despite the substantial push, reform proposals all died in 
committee. The motion picture, recording, and software industries 
provided stiff opposition, as did their many allies in Congress.173 
Congressional members of the SC coalition helped limit Barton’s 
influence by isolating discussion of the bills to his committee. 
Each of the other three proposals discussed in detail in this study 
were subject to hearings in both the commerce and judiciary 
committees in either the House or Senate (or in both); in contrast, 
neither judiciary committee held a hearing on any of the DMCA 
reform bills. Even in Barton’s committee, the proposal never came 
to a vote. Despite the low ceiling set for the DMCA reform 
proposals, however, these efforts represent a watershed moment in 
the DRM policy debate. For the first time, the SFU coalition was 
on the offensive and gaining some traction. The effort may have 
stalled, but it shows how seriously the coalition had grown by the 
mid-2000s. 
V. BROADCAST FLAG 
 The 2000s saw a number of proposals for further expansion 
of copyright’s reach in regulating technology. As discussed above, 
the Hollings bill was among them. Another proposal of note was 
the 2005 Digital Transition Content Security Act,174 which would 
have prevented the re-digitization of analog content.175 While these 
and other proposals drew some attention, the proposal that came 
closest to passage sought to impose a DRM system called the 
“broadcast flag” on digital television (DTV) receivers.176 This 
proposal was the result of sophisticated negotiations between 
multiple industries and other stakeholders. After a rulemaking, the 
FCC passed a broadcast flag mandate,177 but the courts struck it 
down as exceeding the FCC’s regulatory reach.178 The decision 
noted that Congress might give the FCC the jurisdiction, and 
                                                
173 Id. 
174 Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. 
(2005). This proposal to close the so-called “analog hole” was not strictly a 
DRM proposal, but because analog outputs represent a potential weakness in 
DRM schemes, it is a closely related subject. 
175 GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 197. 
176 See id. at 193-222. Gillespie briefly discusses the other contemporary 
proposals before embarking on a detailed examination of the technology and 
politics of the broadcast flag generally. 
177 In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) 
(codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76). 
178 American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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legislation to do so made some headway in Congress. The DTV 
flag even had enough momentum that the proponents of a far less 
developed proposal—for a similar flag mandate on HD radio 
receivers—tried to piggyback on the DTV proposal. The failure of 
these efforts was also a clear sign of the SFU coalition’s growing 
political impact. 
A. Bottling Digital Broadcasts 
Consumers have long been able to record broadcast radio 
and television, first with analog tape and now with digital 
recording devices. This ability has long caused anxiety for the 
content industries. Even though copyright holders have tried to sue 
manufacturers of home recording technology, Sony recognized 
home taping as at least potentially noninfringing; in that case, the 
court recognized as fair use when consumers record television 
programs and watch them later.179 Because the FCC sets the 
technology standards for broadcasting, content owners are unable 
to impose DRM unilaterally on over-the-air broadcasts. To impose 
a DRM scheme on broadcast, they would need the government to 
include at least the potential for DRM into the broadcasting 
standards. 
The transition to digital broadcasting increased copyright 
holders’ anxiety over home recording; digital recordings of digital 
broadcasts are better than digital or analog recordings of analog 
broadcasts. Yet this transition also offered a unique opportunity to 
limit home recording even beyond the technical limits imposed by 
analog technology. Motion picture studios180 seized this 
opportunity, hoping to recreate the success of the relatively sealed 
environment offered by DVD distribution. Their best political 
weapon was the threat to withhold content; without tight DRM, 
they argued, they would withhold their high-value content from 
broadcasting, sabotaging the transition to digital television 
broadcasting.181 
                                                
179 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-56 
(1984). 
180 As movie studios are also core sources of TV shows, their concern is the 
protection of made-for-TV programming as well as that of feature films. Also, 
the dichotomy between studios and broadcasters is for the most part between 
divisions within the same companies rather than between separate companies. 
Each of the major national broadcasters and most of the most successful TV 
programming studios exist as divisions of still-larger media conglomerates. See, 
e.g., Allen J. Scott, The Other Hollywood: The Organizational and Geographic 
Bases of Television-Program Production, 26 MEDIA CULT. & SOC’Y 183 (2004). 
181 GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 200. The studios threatened that they would 
withhold desirable, recent films from broadcast, and broadcasters threatened not 
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 Studios’ best shot at imposing a flag mandate was adding 
DRM capabilities into the standards for DTV. They reached out to 
the PT division—in particular, the consumer electronics industry—
and built an inter-industry coalition to develop a mutually 
acceptable technical solution. This DRM system could then serve 
as the basis for a government mandate. There was no political will 
for encrypting content at the source, so the next best choice was to 
force a mandate that all tuners encrypt content before passing it 
along to other media devices. Tarleton Gillespie explains the 
system: 
 
Digital broadcasts would be accompanied by a mark 
that indicated whether the owner of that content 
would permit it to be redistributed or not. Any 
digital tuner that transformed this signal into a 
displayable form would be required to check for and 
honor this flag. If the content was flagged, the tuner 
would allow it to be recorded only in specified 
formats—formats that would preserve the broadcast 
flag if that copy were passed to another device … 
after encrypting it using one of a limited set of 
authorized encryption technologies.182 
 
In this way, only authorized forms of reuse would be allowed. This 
would have curtailed consumers’ ability to record and reuse 
broadcast media. 
 In 2001, Fox Broadcasting Company first proposed the 
DTV broadcast flag technical standard and began building an inter-
industry coalition. This effort was organized as the Broadcast 
Protection Discussion Group (BPDG), including representatives 
from the major motion picture companies, as well as “consumer 
electronics corporations, . . . information technology and software 
companies, . . . companies specializing in existing forms of copy 
protection, . . . and consumer and public advocate groups.”183 
Despite initial, vocal objections by some participants—in 
particular, NGOs—the process was reasonably smooth. “The 
premise of the flag and how it would work was already agreed 
                                                                                                         
to transmit HD versions of their content. Only the threat to withhold feature 
films had even a patina of credibility. Movie studios have other substantial 
revenue streams that could be threatened—DVD sales, pay and basic cable 
licensing, and so on—while broadcasters rely almost exclusively on advertising 
revenue. Thus, a decision by broadcasters to withhold high-quality versions of 
TV programs would have almost no identifiable benefit other than the cost 
savings of not upgrading production facilities and broadcast towers. 
182 GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 202. 
183 Id. at 203. 
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upon at the start, or agreed upon by enough of the major players 
that critics could be pushed aside.”184 Even groups that actually 
opposed the flag mandate continued to participate, seeking a role 
in steering the process.  
While important differences remained,185 the BPDG 
presented the DTV flag proposal to the FCC as reflecting 
unanimous inter-industry agreement. In November 2003, with all 
the industries on board and the only real opposition coming from 
the NGOs, the FCC passed a rule implementing the broadcast flag 
as a required standard for DTV receivers.186 The rule was to take 
effect July 1, 2005. 
B. Lowering the Broadcast Flag 
 In 2004, a coalition of four NGOs and five library groups 
filed suit to stop the broadcast flag rule from taking effect. Among 
NGOs, Public Knowledge led the charge, joined by the EFF, 
Consumers Union, and Consumers Federation of America. Library 
groups included the American Library Association (ALA), 
Association of Research Libraries, American Association of Law 
Libraries, Medical Library Association, and Special Libraries 
Association. In May 2005, the DC Circuit Court sided with the 
petitioners, holding the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction.187 The 
FCC may regulate receivers, but the 3-judge panel unanimously 
held that the current statute does not grant the FCC the “authority 
to regulate receiver apparatuses after the completion of broadcast 
transmissions.”188 This decision prevented the flag requirement 
from ever taking effect—just two months before the regulation 
would have gone into effect. 
 The court ruling left open the possibility for congressional 
intervention; if the FCC needed congressional authorization, a new 
law could provide it. In May 2006, then-Senator Ted Stevens 
introduced an omnibus telecommunications reform bill.189 One 
section would have authorized the FCC to adopt a broadcast flag 
mandate, permitting the Commission to re-enact its 2003 ruling.190 
This was part of the subtitle known as the Digital Content 
                                                
184 Id. at 204. 
185 The most divisive issue was on the question of how new encryption schemes 
would be approved—the process for certifying devices to handle content after it 
had been encrypted. See GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 206-10. 
186 See supra note 177. 
187 American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
188 Lee, supra note 28, at 411. 
189 Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. (2006). 
190 Id. § 452. 
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Protection Act of 2006.191 The bill was the subject of congressional 
hearings and a relatively high volume of attention, but the 
broadcast flag was only part of the cacophony of debate over the 
bill, which passed committee but never came up for a final vote in 
the Senate.192 
Stevens’ efforts stalled in part due to the remarkable 
groundswell of public demands that network neutrality be part of 
any comprehensive telecommunications reform act,193 though 
other forces of opposition also slowed the bill. Among those forces 
were members of the SFU coalition, who opposed the flag 
mandate. In particular, NGOs such as Public Knowledge and the 
EFF came out in full force against broadcast flag proposals in both 
the House and Senate.194 With the FCC’s decision having been 
overturned, industry voices such as the Consumer Electronics 
Association—who had participated in the BPDG discussions, 
though in part seeking a more permissive system—expressed 
opposition to the bill to overturn ALA v. FCC.195 
It is unclear whether these forces alone could have stopped 
either the whole bill or a standalone broadcast flag bill, but the 
                                                
191 Id. §§ 451-454. 
192  The Stevens bill passed the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation as H.R. 5252, which was the number assigned to the 
telecommunications bill authored by Joe Barton (R-TX) that had already passed 
the House on a vote of 321 to 101. Communications Opportunity, Promotion, 
and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006). Had the Stevens 
bill passed the Senate, this change would have enabled a conference committee 
to work out the substantial difference between the two proposals. 
193 Jeffrey A. Hart, The Net Neutrality Debate in the United States, 8 J. INFO. 
TECH. & POLITICS 418, 418 (2011); Lisa Caruso, Outmanned, Outfoxed, 
Outspent, 38 (32-34) NAT. J 44 (2006), available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/lobbying-law-outmanned-
outfoxed-outspent-20060812?mrefid=site_search; Daniel W. Reilly, The 
Telecom Slayers, SALON (Oct. 2, 2006), 
http://www.salon.com/2006/10/02/slayers/. 
 In the interest of full disclosure, I have long been a public advocate for 
network neutrality. 
As member of the network neutrality movement, it is modestly self-serving to 
credit that movement—rather than the many other political forces that came to 
bear—for stopping the Stevens bill. That caveat in mind, support for net 
neutrality was a roadblock of at least some importance, though it might not have 
been sufficient to stop the bill’s passage. 
194 E.g., Content Protection in the Digital Age: The Broadcast Flag, High-
Definition Radio, and the Analog Hole: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
Telecomms. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th 
Cong. 21-32 (2005) (statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge); 
id. at 77 (letter from Fred von Lohmann, Senior Staff Attorney for Intellectual 
Property, Electronic Frontier Foundation). Both groups also posted copious 
amounts of oppositional materials on their websites. 
195 Id. at 33 (statement of Michael Petricone, Vice President of Government 
Affairs, Consumer Electronics Association). 
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SFU coalition was emboldened by the court’s ruling, and 
opposition to a flag mandate was sustained and powerful. The 
nonprofit and library groups were pivotal in slowing the proposal’s 
momentum; had they not participated heavily, the flag mandate 
would have become law. Their role in the successful suit is the 
most obvious impact, but consider also their seeming success in 
turning the electronics industry against the mandate. During the 
BPDG process, the electronics industry’s concerns were primarily 
about preserving marketable functions (e.g., the capacity to shift 
recorded programs to a user’s computer), and they expressed little 
public objection to the idea of a flag mandate. The outcome of the 
ALA ruling, as well as what was undoubtedly a strong push from 
NGOs,196 emboldened the consumer electronics industry—a key 
portion of the persuadable technology division—to become full-
fledged opponents of a flag mandate. By drawing the electronics 
industry into the opposition, the SFU coalition added more 
political pressure than they could have mustered on their own. 
C.  Few Salute the Audio Flag 
 While the DTV broadcast flag nearly became law, 
proposals for a digital radio flag gained much of their viability 
from piggybacking on the DTV flag effort—and even then, 
proponents abandoned them in their infancy. No similar inter-
industry coalition developed a radio flag, and even members of 
Congress who supported the DTV flag were often opposed to the 
audio flag.197 Despite this, it was contained in two bills, and the 
similarities between the proposals—strategically employed by 
audio flag proponents—gave it at least a patina of credibility. 
 In addition to permitting the FCC to mandate the DTV flag, 
the Stevens bill also includes an audio flag provision, albeit a much 
more prospective one than the DTV flag authorization. If the 
Stevens bill had passed, the DTV authorization would have 
                                                
196 This study did not find public evidence of such coalition building, but it 
would have been irrational of the NGOs not to attempt to persuade the 
electronics industry to weigh in against the flag mandate. Additionally, it would 
be consistent with the literature. Persuading would-be allies to one’s way of 
thinking is a vital inside-the-Beltway policy tactic, and it is often the case—and 
certainly so here—that NGOs are more strident in their positions than their 
potential allies in industry or government. See Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. 
Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment, in 
THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 117, 130 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 2d ed. 2007); 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Gilbert K. St. Clair, & Brian Woods, Explaining 
Change in Policy Subsystems: Analysis of Coalition Stability and Defection over 
Time, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 851 (1991). 
197 HERMAN, supra note 19, at 198. 
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directed the FCC to begin a rulemaking process specifically to 
implement its original 2003 mandate, albeit with minor 
modifications.198 The audio flag authorization would have given 
the FCC the power to implement a similar rule, but only if a 
similar inter-industry process had led to substantial agreement 
within 18 months; otherwise, the Commission was to report back 
to Congress.199 
Also in 2006, Representative Mike Ferguson introduced 
legislation granting the FCC the authority to require audio flag 
compliance for digital radio tuners.200 Whereas the audio flag 
provisions of the Stevens bill would have required a substantial 
inter-industry consensus, the Ferguson bill made no such 
stipulation; it simply granted the Commission the authority to 
impose an audio flag mandate. While the omnibus Stevens bill had 
a great deal of political muscle behind it and was close to passage, 
the much more targeted Ferguson bill never gained much traction. 
For instance, many members of Congress who supported the DTV 
mandate stated explicitly that they did not think the audio flag 
mandate was a good idea.201 The lack of a preexisting inter-
industry agreement weighed heavily against its passage. 
Another factor also weighed against the audio flag 
proposal: the recording industry has a substantially diminished 
capacity to withhold content from broadcasters. Broadcasters 
seeking to use movies and TV shows must negotiate with 
copyright holders on a work-by-work basis, giving both industries 
a reason to work together to avoid a negotiation showdown.202 In 
contrast, terrestrial radio stations are in a much less precarious 
position when it comes to getting licenses to broadcast content. 
The statutory list of the exclusive rights of copyright holders203 
grants no general right of public performance right for sound 
recordings; there is an exclusive right of performance for sound 
recordings that applies to digital audio transmissions,204 but a 
separate exemption makes clear that this does not apply to digital 
broadcasts by FM stations.205 In short, sound recording copyright 
holders get no royalties from and have no leverage over terrestrial 
                                                
198 Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 452 (2006). 
199 Id. §§ 453-454. 
200 Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006, H.R. 4861, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
201 HERMAN, supra note 19, at 198-99. 
202 Broadcasting content is a public performance, and the copyright holders for 
“motion pictures and other audiovisual works” enjoy an exclusive right to 
control their public performance. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). 
203 Id. § 106. 
204 Id. § 106(6). 
205 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2006). 
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broadcasters.206 Not only do record companies not try to stop radio 
airplay, they strongly encourage it—so much so that it has led to 
the practice of record companies paying large sums to get their 
songs on the radio.207 
There is an exclusive right of public performances of 
musical compositions,208 so all broadcasters must negotiate royalty 
terms with these copyright holders—generally songwriters or their 
heirs. Yet such licensing agreements via royalty collecting 
societies (ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC) are a long-established 
mechanism for collecting reasonable royalties for songwriters.209 
As the AHRA debate illustrated, music publishers’ digital 
copyright strategy is based on royalty collection rather than DRM 
mandates.210 As such, publishers did not make even an idle threat 
to withhold licenses from broadcasters. With no music industry 
threat to withhold content, the audio flag proposal was treated with 
little urgency.  
 Like the DMCA reform bills, the audio and DTV broadcast 
flag bills provide excellent opportunities to see the SC and SFU 
coalitions in action. Both efforts warranted substantial attention 
from all interested parties, but each coalition was strong enough to 
stop the other’s proposals from becoming law. In particular, the 
failure of the broadcast flag proposals further highlights the growth 
of the SFU coalition. Without their focused resistance in the courts 
and in Congress, the broadcast flag mandate would have become 
law. That the broadcast flag has already been swept into the 
dustbin of history is a remarkable victory for a coalition that was, 
by all rights, just getting started. 
VI. AFTER DRM: FROM THE DISC TO THE WHOLE 
WIDE WEB 
  
From the SFU coalition’s perspective, the gains of the 
2000s have been encouraging but far from enough to be satisfied 
with the current policy dynamics around copyright. In the years 
since 2006, the SC coalition has also remained the more powerful 
side in the debate. While there have been a number of other 
                                                
206 Cassondra C. Anderson, Recent Development, “We Can Work It Out:” A 
Chance to Level the Playing Field for Radio Broadcasters, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
72, 73-74 (2011). 
207 Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON.COM (Mar. 14, 2001), 
http://www.salon.com/2001/03/14/ payola_2/. 
208 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
209 See Anderson, supra note 206, at 93 (Anderson writing approvingly of “the 
rate of 3% to 5% of revenue that all radio broadcasters pay to music publishers 
and songwriters through their licenses with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC.).” 
210 See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text. 
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notable events, two developments in particular help illustrate the 
trajectory of the politics of copyright to date. Both show the SFU 
coalition’s continued and even growing relevance despite the SC 
coalition’s continued dominance. They also demonstrate that, 
while DRM restrictions will likely remain in place for the 
foreseeable future, the combination of DRM technologies and the 
laws that back them clearly have not produced the reductions in 
infringement predicted by the content industries. 
A. Boucher’s Efforts End 
First, Rick Boucher’s proposed DMCA reforms—and then, 
Boucher’s time in Congress—went out with a whimper. In 2007, 
Boucher introduced a bill with a watered-down version of his 
DMCA reform proposals.211 In his 2003 and 2005 bills, Boucher’s 
proposals would have tied DMCA violations to infringement, 
meaning that circumvention for noninfringing purposes and 
technologies capable of substantial noninfringing uses would have 
been protected as legal.212 In an effort to find something more 
politically palatable, Boucher wrote his 2007 bill such that it 
merely would have created a narrow list of exemptions to the basic 
ban on circumvention.213 These exemptions made a small dent in 
the DMCA, providing the right to do things like circumvent the 
DRM on DVDs to show embedded high-quality clips as part of in-
class lectures, or to circumvent the technology that locks cell 
                                                
211 Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007, 
H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007). Section 2, the other substantive section of 
the bill, would have instructed the court to remit damages for secondary 
infringement, “except in a case in which the copyright owner sustains the burden 
of proving, and the court finds, that the act or acts constituting such secondary 
infringement were done under circumstances in which no reasonable person 
could have believed such conduct to be lawful.’’ Id. § 2(a). That section also 
would have encoded the Sony standard as follows: “No person shall be liable for 
copyright infringement based on the design, manufacture, or distribution of a 
hardware device that is capable of substantial, commercially significant 
noninfringing use.’’ Id. § 2(b). Based on this section of the bill alone, this author 
was surprised that the proposal was allowed to die on the vine without a 
meaningful push from the persuadable technology division. 
212 Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. 
(2003); Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
213 Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007, 
H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007). The other substantive section, § 2, sought to 
reduce the scope of secondary liability for technology companies and, in 
findings where reasonable people might disagree about whether there was 
secondary liability, to reduce damages. 
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phones to specific networks.214 This proposal would have had no 
impact on the vast majority of would-be noninfringing users. Even 
more significantly, the bill did not touch the bans on the 
development and marketing of circumvention devices. Despite this 
very limited reach, the bill died in committee with little fanfare. 
Boucher introduced no similar bill in the next Congress. 
The SFU coalition also took a hit to its roll of congressional 
allies when, after running unopposed in 2008, Boucher lost his 
2010 re-election bid.215 There is no reason to believe Boucher’s 
loss was due to his SFU allegiance. Rather, it was more to his 
being a Democrat in a conservative Virginia district during an 
election that was ripe for Republicans across the country—and in 
particular, due to his support for cap-and-trade carbon 
regulations.216 Despite these larger political forces, it is significant 
that Boucher lost despite his having been among the SFU 
coalition’s most-beloved congresspersons;217 if even Rick Boucher 
couldn’t leverage such an allegiance into electoral safety, the 
message to other congressional allies and would-be supporters is 
clear. The SFU coalition does retain several vocal congressional 
allies, like Senator Ron Wyden and Representatives Zoe Lofgren 
and Anna Eshoo,218 though these are all members with relatively 
safe seats in regions with fairly high technology-sector presence. 
They are up against a much deeper roster of SC allies, including 
many from states such as Vermont (Senator Patrick Leahy), Texas 
(Rep. Lamar Smith), and Michigan (Rep. John Conyers) that are 
not exactly well-known hotbeds of media production and 
distribution. 
                                                
214 More specifically, it proposed making permanent the six temporary 
exemptions to the basic ban on circumvention granted by the Register of 
Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress from 2006 to 2009. Rulemaking on 
Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological Measures that 
Control Access to Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www. 
copyright.gov/1201/2006/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
215 Jim Nolan, After 14 Terms, Boucher Is Out; Griffith, Majority Leader in Va. 
House, Stuns 9th District Democrat, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 2010, 
at A9. 
216 Tony Romm, Tech Community Lament Rick Boucher Loss, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44589.html. 
217 Id. 
218 Among other examples of support for the SFU coalition, each has publicly 
expressed opposition to the 2011 Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 
discussed in Part VII.B. See Alexander Howard, Internet Companies And 
Lawmakers Speak Out Against The Stop Online Piracy Act, HUFFPOST TECH 
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mobileweb/2011/ 
11/15/internet-companies-and-la_n_1095477.html. 
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B. Domain Seizures: COICA, ICE, and SOPA/PIPA 
 Another major development in copyright politics since 
2006 has been the advancement of various strategies for seizing the 
domain names of sites that are found to be hosting infringing 
materials. Imagine a website that hosts videos at the website 
AllYourVideosHere.com. Imagine that enough of the content on 
the site is infringing—or even arguably infringing—that it draws 
the ire of copyright holders. Those copyright holders would be 
happy if they could seize that domain name away from the site’s 
hosts, so that a user who types AllYourVideosHere.com into his or 
her web browser would not find the site with the infringing videos. 
Even better for copyright holders, that domain name could be 
redirected to a different server with a site that encouraged users not 
to visit sites with infringing content. This is the ideal outcome for 
those who advocate domain seizures. 
In late 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy advanced a domain 
seizures bill, the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits 
Act (COICA).219 It would have authorized the U.S. Attorney 
General to seek court action against a domain if it is “primarily 
designed, has no demonstrable, commercially significant purpose 
or use other than, or is marketed by its operator, or by a person 
acting in concert with the operator, to offer” content that infringes 
copyrights or trademarks.220 The measure also would have given 
courts the power to force Internet domain registrars to “suspend 
operation of, and lock, the domain name.”221 For those websites 
registered abroad, a court order could be used to compel Internet 
service providers to block users from reaching those domains, to 
prevent financial services providers from processing their 
transactions, and to prevent Internet advertisers from serving ads to 
these sites.222 This all would have happened without an adversarial 
hearing during which a site’s operator could defend its right to 
continue about its business without being shuttered. In most cases, 
the operators of an affected site would lose their domains and face 
other negative effects before they even knew what had 
happened.223 COICA drew immediate opposition from NGOs,224 
                                                
219 Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
220 Id. § 2324(a)(2)(A). 
221 Id. § 2324(e)(1). 
222 Id. § 2324(e)(2). 
223 An operator of such a site could later petition the court to undo its orders 
“based on evidence that (i) the Internet site associated with the domain name 
subject to the order is no longer dedicated to infringing activities; or (ii) the 
interests of justice require that the order be modified, suspended, or vacated.” Id. 
§ 2324(h)(1)(B). That such a court appearance would come only after a website 
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scholars,225 the technology press,226 and Internet engineers.227 The 
bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in November—leaving 
its supporters too little time to pass it through the full Senate and 
House, but setting up a replay of the debate in the 112th Congress. 
Also in 2010, the Department of Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of Homeland Security, 
started seizing domains of websites accused of copyright and 
trademark infringement in an operation dubbed “Operation In Our 
Sites.”228 These efforts are still active at the time of this writing.229 
While a fuller analysis of the costs and benefits of such an 
operation are well beyond the scope of this Article, the operation 
has drawn much criticism. One critique is that many of the sites 
have been taken down even though they are not clearly dedicated 
to infringing content. Several have been shuttered merely for 
linking to sites with allegedly infringing content.230 Several of the 
music sites that have been taken down were apparently targeted 
because they posted files that were given to them by record label or 
                                                                                                         
operator had lost the domain name, advertisers, links from ISPs, and/or ability to 
process transactions is, in this author’s estimation, a profound affront to both 
due process and the First Amendment. 
224 E.g., Peter Eckersley, UPDATE: The Case Against COICA, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Nov. 18, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/11/case-against-
coica; Concerns Regarding S. 3804, Combating Online Infringement and 
Counterfeits Act, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/concerns-regarding-coica-pk-2-pager. 
225 E.g., Zoe Argento, et al.,  Law Professors’ Letter in Opposition to S. 3804 
(Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act), PUB. KNOWLEDGE 
(Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/LawProfCOICA.pdf. 
226 E.g., Mike Masnick, Why Voting for COICA Is a Vote for Censorship, 
TECHDIRT (Nov. 22, 2010), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101121/23584311958/why-voting-coica-is-
vote-censorship.shtml. 
227 E.g., David P. Reed, et al., Letter from Internet Engineers Opposing COICA, 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-
internet-engineers-opposing-coica. 
228 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Operation In 
Our Sites Targets Internet Movie Pirates: 
ICE, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Seize Multiple Web Sites for Criminal Copyright 
Violations, (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1006/100630losangeles.htm. 
229 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE 
Announces Results of “Operation Strike Out”: Protects Consumers from 
Counterfeit Sports Paraphernalia on the Internet and on the Streets (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/ 111031washingtondc.htm. 
230 Abigail Phillips, What Congress Can Learn from the Recent ICE Seizures, 




Herman: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DRM AND RELATED COPYRIGHT DEBATES
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012




artist representatives.231 The wave of lawsuits against YouTube 
highlights the possibility that, had domain seizure procedures been 
in place five years ago, the world’s number-one video sharing site 
may well have been seized.232 Critics have also charged ICE with 
administrative overreach,233 and several of those affected by 
domain seizures have claimed that the Administration has been 
shockingly non-responsive to their requests for more information 
or reconsideration.234 
Despite all these critiques of ICE domain seizures, many 
members of the current Congress sought to pass a COICA-like bill. 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property 
Act (PROTECT-IP Act, or PIPA) of 2011,235 and Representative 
Lamar Smith introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).236 
Both bills are variants on the domain seizure idea first introduced 
in COICA. On November 16, 2011, the House Committee on the 
Judiciary held a hearing237 that was heavily stacked in favor of the 
bill’s passage,238 and the committee’s website describing the 
hearing expresses clear enthusiasm about the bill.239 At the very 
                                                
231 Sherwin Siy, More Domain Seizures from DOJ/ICE: Spanish Website Seized 
Despite Legal Status in Spain, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/more-domain-seizures-dojice-spanish-
website-s; Mike Masnick, Senator Wyden Asks WTF Is Up With Homeland 
Security Domain Seizures, TECHDIRT (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110202/23363812934/senator-wyden-asks-
wtf-is-up-with-homeland-security-domain-seizures.shtml. 
232 See Siy, supra note 231. 
233 Masnick, supra note 226. 
234 Mike Masnick, Why We Haven't Seen Any Lawsuits Filed Against The 
Government Over Domain Seizures: Justice Department Stalling, TECHDIRT 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110521/15125114374/why-
we-havent-seen-any-lawsuits-filed-against-government-over-domain-seizures-
justice-department-stalling.shtml. 
235 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong.  (2011) (also abbreviated 
as the PROTECT-IP Act). 
236 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
237 Hearing on: H.R. 3261, the “Stop Online Piracy Act”, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_11162011.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2012). 
238 Nate Anderson, At Web Censorship Hearing, Congress Guns for “Pro-
Pirate” Google, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 16, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/11/at-web-censorship-hearing-congress-guns-for-pro-pirate-
google.ars. 
239 SOPA Hearing, supra note 237 (stating, inter alia, “The bill modernizes our 
criminal and civil statutes to meet new IP enforcement challenges and protect 
American jobs. The proposal reflects a bipartisan and bicameral commitment 
toward ensuring that law enforcement and job creators have the necessary tools 
to protect American intellectual property from counterfeiting and piracy”). 
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start of the hearing, Judiciary Chair Lamar Smith accused 
Google—the only substantive opponents at the hearing table—of 
obstructionism; he also accused the company of supporting 
“rogue” websites.240 This is consistent with both judiciary 
committees’ longstanding support for the SC coalition.241 
 The same groups that spoke out against COICA quickly 
rose up to oppose PIPA and SOPA in 2011, though this time, much 
of the persuadable technology division has also put their weight 
into opposing the bills.242 In advance of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary hearing held on November 16, 2011, a veritable 
who’s who of Internet companies signed on to a letter of 
opposition; signatories included Google, Facebook, Twitter, 
Yahoo!, Mozilla, and eBay.243 Collectively, these voices have also 
won sympathy from several members of Congress who themselves 
sent a letter to Smith opposing SOPA.244 
At this point—specifically, through mid-November, 
2011—the conventional political analysis would have cast the odds 
of something like SOPA passing as very strong. Even with the 
Internet industry ramping up its lobbying expenditures in recent 
years, SOPA’s opponents are still badly outspent on Capitol Hill; 
groups that support SOPA spent more than ten times as much as 
the bill’s opponents in 2010 and over six times as much through 
the third quarter of 2011—spending $280 million in less than two 
years.245 As the persuadable technology division has more revenue 
and a bigger impact on the economy,246 this imbalance means that 
SC groups spend a far greater share of their revenue on lobbying. 
Additionally, the SC coalition’s much longer history of working 
with Congress—and their much better-connected roster of 
lobbyists, including most notably MPAA chief and former 
Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd—means they would have a 
substantial advantage even if the SFU coalition had matched their 
lobbying expenditures dollar-for-dollar in 2011. Further, as the rest 
                                                
240 Anderson, supra note 238 (quoting Rep. Smith, “one of the companies 
represented here today has sought to obstruct the Committee’s consideration of 
bipartisan legislation. Perhaps this should come as no surprise given that Google 
just settled a federal criminal investigation into the company’s active promotion 
of rogue websites that pushed illegal prescription and counterfeit drugs on 
American consumers”). 
241 HERMAN, supra note 19, at 170. 
242 Declan McCullagh, Google, Facebook, Zynga Oppose New SOPA Copyright 




245 Jennifer Martinez, Shootout at the Digital Corral, POLITICO (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68448.html.  
246 See supra note 140. 
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of this study shows, the technology industry has previously 
established a track record of going along with expansions of 
copyright, as long as those expansions are perceived as likely and 
are tempered so that the technology sector’s financial interests are 
not substantially harmed. For all of these reasons, one of two 
outcomes for SOPA and PIPA looked very likely: either the 
technology sector would have been sufficiently mollified that the 
bill would have passed in somewhat modified form, or the core 
SFU advocates would have again produced just enough friction to 
keep the bill from passing. 
What happened instead was nothing short of game-
changing. The Internet—already the bogeyman of the SC coalition 
for its capacity to facilitate infringement—became the means for 
mobilizing millions of citizens who spoke out against SOPA and 
PIPA. The first action was on November 16, 2011, which was the 
date of the heavily stacked hearing in the House Committee on the 
Judiciary to consider SOPA.247 To mobilize opposition, hundreds 
of websites engaged in a coordinated information campaign, 
hosting banners urging users to learn more about the arguments 
against act and to contact Congress to express opposition.248 The 
site was hosted by a group, Fight for the Future, which was 
founded in late 2011 and is “aligned with groups like EFF and 
Public Knowledge but [is] campaign-focused and public-
facing.”249 Other groups also played key roles in spreading 
awareness about this campaign. Other campaign sponsors included 
core SFU advocates—not only EFF and Public Knowledge, but 
also groups such as the Free Software Foundation, Creative 
Commons, and Mozilla.250 Other sponsors as of November 17 
included Demand Progress and the Participatory Politics 
Foundation.251 Links to the website and its calls to action were 
widely publicized on some of the web’s most visible sites, 
including Tumblr, Reddit, and Mozilla.252 
                                                
247 See supra note 237. 
248 Fight for the Future, American Censorship Day November 16—Join the Fight 
To Stop SOPA, AMERICAN CENSORSHIP DAY, http://americancensorship.org (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
249 Fight for the Future, Campaign Coordinator, 
http://fightforthefuture.org/jobs/campaign-director (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
250 Fight for the Future, American Censorship Day, supra note 248. 
251 Id. 
252 Kirsten Salyer, “American Censorship Day” Makes an Online Statement: 
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The effort did a great deal to create awareness about and 
motivate constituent calls against SOPA and PROTECT-IP.253 The 
American Censorship Day website claimed to have generated over 
a million emails and four calls per second to Congress that day.254 
This was an extension of the SFU coalition’s longstanding strategy 
of heavy Internet advocacy,255 and it was a remarkably successful 
mobilization for an issue that previously had little visibility in the 
eyes of the public. While the proposal’s potential negative effects 
were a substantial force motivating so much online action, this 
explosion of constituent action is also probably due in part to the 
issue’s clarity relative to the DRM debate. Despite having tried to 
explain this issue to perhaps thousands of previously uninitiated 
people, I still have difficulty explaining in a brief period what 
DRM is, how it is regulated, and why that is important. In contrast, 
a great number of Internet users were quickly able to understand—
and fear—the proposal that infringing sites’ domain names would 
be seized and then redirected to government-sponsored anti-piracy 
sites. The issue had the clarity that gave these technology 
enthusiasts the chance to take a specific political action in defense 
of the Internet—not to mention an expression of their visceral 
dislike for the content industry, harvested over the past decade of 
SC coalition missteps. 
The congressional response to the November action was, 
unfortunately for SFU actors, muted. A few additional members 
joined the opposition, but the bills still seemed fairly likely to pass. 
PIPA was to be put to a vote in the full Senate on January 24, 
2012, and passage in the House seemed not too far behind.256 
Undeterred, SFU actors doubled down on the strategy of reaching 
out to sympathetic websites and engaging in a coordinated day of 
action; they scheduled a second day of Internet action for January 
18, 2012. This action drew many thousands more sites to 
participate—over 115,000 in all—and more of the web’s top sites 
participated.257 More dramatically, many sites in the January action 
chose to blackout their pages to varying degrees—an illustration of 
                                                
253 Mike Masnick, Why the Public Is Willing To Rally Against SOPA/PIPA, But 
Not for It, TECHDIRT (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111123/00002616879/why-public-is-willing-
to-rally-against-sopapipa-not-it.shtml. 
254 Fight for the Future, American Censorship Day, supra note 248. 
255 Herman, supra note 16. 
256 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid had scheduled a cloture vote on the bill. 
Jennifer Martinez, SOPA and PIPA Dead For Now, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71720.html. While technically a 
procedural vote, cloture requires 60 votes of support, making it the largest 
obstacle to final passage. 
257 See Fight for the Future, The January 18 Blackout/Strike in Numbers, SOPA 
STRIKE, http://sopastrike.com/numbers (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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the censorship that they accused the bill of threatening. The most 
noteworthy site to go dark was Wikipedia, the sixth most-visited 
website in the world,258 and many more sites with very high 
visibility went dark (e.g., Mozilla, Reddit), made prominent 
changes on their home pages (e.g., Google, Wired, Drudge 
Report), successfully encouraged thousands of users turn their 
personal pages dark (e.g., Tumblr, WordPress), or became vehicles 
by which millions spread anti-SOPA/PIPA messages (e.g., 
Twitter).259 This became the “largest online protest in history.”260 
The coordinated action worked beyond anyone’s hopes. 
According to Fight for the Future, over ten million people signed 
their petition against SOPA and PIPA, and there were over eight 
million attempts to call Congress.261 Four million people sent 
emails to Congress through EFF, Fight for the Future, and Demand 
Progress, and “Wikipedia wasn’t even counting.”262 So many 
constituents tried to contact Congress that the phone lines were 
flooded and many members’ sites crashed.263 This made an 
immediate impact on the balance of congressional opinion on the 
bills. As of the morning of January 18, 2012, the bills had 80 
supporters and 31 opponents in the House and Senate; by the next 
day, it had shifted radically to 63 supporters and 122 opponents.264 
As of this writing, the balance is 55 supporters and 205 
opponents,265 but the bills were effectively dead even before the 
additional opponents piled on. On January 20, Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid cancelled the scheduled cloture vote, and 
Representative Lamar Smith said that the Judiciary Committee he 
chairs would cancel consideration of the bill that had been 
scheduled for February.266 
                                                
258 Top Sites, ALEXA (Feb. 20, 2012), at http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
259 Fight for the Future, supra note 257. I am certain that millions of Facebook 
users also posted in opposition, but I found no sources that could verify this. 
260 Boonsri Dickinson, The Largest Online Protest in History Started Here, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/largest-
protest-in-history-started-here-more-than-a-billion-people-will-see-anti-sopa-
messages-2012-1. 
261 Fight for the Future, supra note 257. 
262 Id. 
263 The Daily Caller, SOPA Protests Caused Panic, Crashed Government 
Websites, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/sopa-protests-
caused-panic-crashed-government-websites-214506713.html.  
264 Josh Constine, SOPA Protests Sway Congress: 31 Opponents Yesterday, 122 
Now, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 19, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/19/sopa-
opponents-supporters/. 
265 Dan Nguyen, SOPA Opera: Where Do Your Members of Congress Stand on 
SOPA and PIPA?, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://projects.propublica.org/sopa/. 
266 Martinez, supra note 256. 
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 With a presidential and congressional election looming, 
nothing like SOPA and PIPA is likely to be considered until after 
the election, if ever. Something much more modest likely would 
have passed without the public even noticing. As a more modest 
goal, SC advocates could have seized on to the OPEN Act that was 
submitted in both the House267 and Senate268 as an alternative to 
SOPA and PIPA.269 The Act would set up a procedure for the U.S. 
International Trade Commission to investigate sites accused of 
systemic violations of copyright or trademark.270 If the 
Commission finds a site to be dedicated to infringement, the 
copyright holder could then take a legal order to that site’s 
payment processors and advertisers to stop doing business with the 
site.271 In this way, infringing sites could be starved of revenue—
not a small penalty to be doled out to sites based outside the United 
States. Instead, SC lobbyists and their allies in Congress tried to 
ram SOPA and PIPA through as quickly as possible, with little 
input from other stakeholders, and despite vocal opposition. In 
short, they tried to act as if the policy dynamic of the copyright 
debate was still that which was in place in the 1990s.272 Rather 
than getting what they wanted, they substantially strengthened the 
SFU coalition’s hand—not just for this debate, but for the 
indefinite future. In the world of policy advocacy writ large, it 
would be hard to name a better contemporary example of 
comeuppance. 
C. The Legacy of the SOPA Blackout 
A full exploration of the run-up to the SOPA blackout, how 
it happened, and its aftermath is beyond the scope of this study.273 
Still, it is already clear that the debate over copyright will never be 
the same again. Whether an SC ally, an SFU supporter, or one 
                                                
267 Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
268 Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, S. 2029, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
269 E.g., Julie Samuels, An Alternative to SOPA: An Open Process Befitting an 
Open Internet, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/12/alternative-sopa-open-process-befitting-
open-internet. 
270 Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, S. 2029, 112th 
Cong. §2 (2011)(See the portion that would create 19 U.S.C. §337A(c).). 
271 Id. (See the portion that would create 19 U.S.C. §337A(g).). 
272 See supra Parts II-III. 
273 The study was already accepted for publication before the blackout 
happened. The editorial board deserves extra thanks for the flexibility to give me 
the extra time to update the article in light of this obviously noteworthy 
development. 
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without any clear allegiances, any scholar who cares about 
copyright law—or the policy process in general—now cannot help 
but be intrigued to see how the copyright debate plays out going 
forward. 
The SOPA blackout and its aftermath have left several key legacies 
in the politics of copyright in the future. First and most obviously, 
the Internet community and the general public have now mobilized 
around this issue to a previously unimaginable degree. This study’s 
story of the building of the SFU coalition provides an important 
context for understanding the intellectual and logistical backing of 
the uprising. The efforts begun by Peter Jaszi and company helped 
create a network of dedicate activists—and, before long, many of 
them professional—who could represent the voices of ordinary 
citizens on copyright. Likewise, beginning with the anti-RIAA 
backlash in the Napster era and the wide dissemination of pro-SFU 
messages by public intellectuals and advocates, the broad Internet-
using public had long since begun to distrust the content 
industry—to put it charitably. Yet these potent forces had not yet 
come together in a large-scale political action until SOPA seemed 
certain of passage. The proposal was so objectionable, and the 
process by which it had advanced so willfully designed to avoid 
the frantic critical input by the technology sector and the public, 
that millions of voters had a “Howard Beale moment—[Internet] 
users were mad as hell, and they weren’t going to take it 
anymore.”274 
 Of course, millions of people only act in concert when 
there is substantial coordination. The SOPA protests “were a 
combination of independent decisions by websites including 
Wikipedia and Reddit to go black on Jan. 18, behind-the-scenes 
organization by a number of groups, and grassroots response to the 
blackout and other online efforts . . . .”275 Unfortunately, most of 
the reporting on the backlash has credited the technology industry, 
failing to understand the far more significant roles played by the 
collective decisions of thousands of power users—including those 
who pushed group-created sites Wikipedia and Reddit to action—
as well as core SFU allies including NGOs, public intellectuals, 
and journalists.276 Of course the technology industry pushed back 
                                                
274 Larry Downes, Who Really Stopped SOPA, and Why?, FORBES (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/01/25/who-really-
stopped-sopa-and-why/. 




276 If there were an award for dogged anti-SOPA blogging, it would have to go 
to Mike Masnick at TechDirt.  
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against SOPA and PIPA, and their response worked synergistically 
with the public outcry—helping to fuel the understanding that 
something bad was in the works, then helping to draw constituents 
to contact Congress. Yet in the months before the public outcry, 
when the best hope for stopping Hollywood really was Silicon 
Valley, SOPA and PIPA were en route to easy passage.277 Even 
though its website was a key driver in the January action, the 
“response was not organized by Google or any tech money at all 
(except perhaps the meager salaries that tech-policy writers tend to 
receive).”278 Rather, the technology industry used mostly inside-
the-Beltway politics up until the last minute, when it became clear 
that these strategies would not stop the bills—and that the 
technology community was going to try a far more public strategy. 
It was only then that technology industry heavyweights decided to 
join the online action, and they were nearly as surprised by their 
good fortune as the content industry was surprised by its own bad 
fortune. 
Now that a major public uprising has happened, the odds of 
another action of at least substantial political importance are 
substantially higher. There are millions of citizens who have 
already been persuaded that the Internet is under political attack—
but that the Internet can be defended by the kind of successful 
action in which they have already participated. SFU-allied NGOs 
have greatly expanded their visibility and legitimacy, making it 
easier for them to reach out to the public and potential 
organizational allies going forward. Similarly, general political 
advocacy websites and groups on both the left and right, from 
RedState to Demand Progress, now know that this issue matters to 
their audiences. Many millions of these citizens shared their 
contact information with one or more of these groups, greatly 
facilitating future outreach. On these and many other counts, future 
mass actions on copyright, though unlikely to be as visible or 
utterly effective, just became a great deal easier to execute. 
As a second legacy, policymakers are now terrified of the 
political backlash that comes when they go against the wishes of 
the technology crowd. It will be difficult to muster a similar deluge 
of Congress over copyright again in the future, but the issue’s 
resonance with voters is now undeniable, and members have begun 
proceeding with caution when considering new legislation 
affecting digital media. Unfortunately, this fear is also wrapped in 
the popular misunderstanding that the major technology industry 
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players are the ones who orchestrated the protests. For instance, 
writing for Politico, Kim Hart observes: 
 
[A] new warning has entered the Hill vernacular: 
“Don’t get SOPA’d.” Lawmakers are tiptoeing 
around issues that could tick off tech heavyweights 
such as Google or Amazon . . . . Rep. Jared Polis 
(D-Colo.) said the anti-SOPA movement showed a 
certain “coming of political age” for the tech 
industry, and his colleagues in the House are 
treading carefully. “They’re involving the tech 
community more and are more interested in 
listening,” said Polis, who also opposed SOPA. 
“They’re paying closer attention now.”279 
 
In linking to this story, technology publisher and free software 
evangelist Tim O’Reilly pushes back against the article’s mistaken 
assumptions. “Unfortunately, . . . the story devolves into the 
familiar narrative about the competition between ‘Hollywood’ and 
‘Silicon Valley’ . . . . The SOPA protests weren't the work of some 
Silicon Valley lobby[;] . . .they were the work of ‘the Internet 
public.’”280 Even if they are misguided as to who caused the largest 
online protest in history, however, a great many policymakers are 
now terrified of being seen as anti-technology, and this legacy will 
greatly strengthen the hands of the SFU coalition and technology 
industry voices in future copyright battles. 
 There is also a third important legacy of the SOPA action: 
the persuadable technology (PT) division has moved closer toward 
full membership in the SFU coalition. Unlike the content 
industries, technology companies have no hard-wired, extreme 
views on copyright, and they have a history of compromising on 
the issue. Yet they will also not soon forget the degree to which the 
SC coalition shut them out of the discussion leading up to SOPA 
and tried to push the bill through over their vocal opposition.281 
                                                
279 Kim Hart, Pols Fear ‘SOPA Backlash’, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73802.html. 
280 Tim O’Reilly, “Don’t Get SOPA’d”: Congress Learns to Fear the Internet 
Public, GOOGLE PLUS (Mar. 18, 2012), 
https://plus.google.com/107033731246200681024/posts/Xkp5DhcyqmE. 
281 E.g., Mike Masnick, Disney Refused Invitation From Senator Feinstein To 
Meet With Tech Companies Over PIPA/SOPA, TECHDIRT (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120118/01464317448/disney-refused-
invitation-senator-feinstein-to-meet-with-tech-companies-over-pipasopa.shtml. 
   When Public Knowledge Legal Director Harold Feld posted this on Facebook, 
the head of the Consumer Electronics Association, Gary Shapiro, bemoaned in a 
comment, “Valenti and Glickman would always pick up the phone. . . . I can’t 
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Going forward, the SC coalition will have a lot of trouble earning 
the trust of PT actors, even if SC actors adopt a more cooperative 
process going forward. Likewise, the SFU coalition will have 
much less difficulty getting PT backing for their agenda, including 
less difficulty keeping PT groups from making deals with the SC 
coalition on new bills. Technology companies also now have 
strong business reasons to be leery of reaching a political deal with 
SC interests. The object lesson here was GoDaddy, a web host and 
domain registrar that initially came out in support of SOPA. This 
led to a mass exodus of customers that, by late 2011, led to the 
company quickly shifting to opposing the bill.282 In the future, 
even those technology companies that might otherwise be willing 
to reach a deal on new copyright legislation will be leery of 
suffering the fate that GoDaddy endured. Especially when 
combined with broader public mobilization on copyright and 
policymakers’ newfound respect for the Internet public, the 
technology industry’s steps toward the SFU coalition will further 
reduce the SC coalition’s capacity to advance its agenda. 
CONCLUSION 
 The last twenty-five years have brought a sea change in 
copyright law. This is commonly understood to be due to new 
digital technologies, but that is only half the story; the other half is 
the rise of a potent group of political actors who seek to defend 
those technologies against the encroachment by copyright law. 
Beginning with opposition to what would become the DMCA, and 
growing rapidly in the years since the DMCA’s passage, SFU 
advocates have built a powerful multi-site organizational 
infrastructure. They have also spread the SFU message to millions 
of citizens. Especially as the downfall of SOPA/PIPA has shown, it 
is now much harder to pass strong-copyright legislations. The 
debate over DRM was a key part of the rallying cry of the SFU 
coalition, although related debates have also been quite significant. 
In particular, in the years since 2006, as the SC coalition’s 
strategies have evolved from new DRM regulations to new Internet 
regulations, the SFU coalition has become even more relevant. 
 This is a sharp change from the policy dynamics of 
copyright during the twentieth century. The Audio Home 
                                                                                                         
even get a hello lunch with Dodd.” When I asked if I could quote him, he said, 
“Just factual!” (on file with the author). 
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Recording Act became law with little substantial resistance. While 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act attracted more pushback, opponents did not have 
time to organize a coherent coalition until after the passage of 
something like Lehman’s White Paper proposal was nearly a 
foregone conclusion. Between 1999 and 2002, however, several 
events led to radical changes in the politics of copyright. The 
publicity around peer-to-peer trading, the threat of Hollings’ bill, 
and the sharp rise in participation by NGOs and public intellectuals 
reshaped the playing field. By 2003, the SFU coalition had grown 
powerful enough that it had to be accounted for by the SC 
coalition. It played a central role in killing the broadcast flag 
proposals, and it made a credible push to reform the DMCA. 
 This study is largely a story about the SFU coalition’s 
substantial successes at building and deploying organizations and 
ideas. In the decade after the DMCA’s passage, countless SFU-
allied groups were started, including advocacy- and litigation-
focused NGOs, academic centers, and student law clinics.283 Along 
with library groups—perhaps the longest-standing voices for 
copyright moderation, though among the quieter voices today—
these NGOs and scholars are at the core of a significant, 
permanent, organized coalition when there was none before, and 
the results have spoken for themselves—even before the SOPA 
blackout of January, 2012. 
 For those who knew little about the history of copyright 
advocacy, the SOPA strike seemed to come out of nowhere. For 
those who have watched these debates unfold over the years, 
however, it was clear that the birth and growth of the SFU 
coalition had already made a substantial change in the political 
dynamics around the issue. Further, as I document in quantitative 
detail elsewhere,284 the SFU coalition has long been engaged in 
vociferous online communications. This all-out effort to reach as 
many people online as possible has been a nice complement to 
their dedicated and consistent offline communication, and the 
combination has helped counterbalance their extreme funding 
disadvantage relative to the SC coalition’s old-fashioned lobbying 
muscle. Even before the SOPA blackout, I had concluded that, 
based at least on the circumstantial evidence, Internet mobilization 
has helped shape policy outcomes in copyright. Now, with the 
SOPA blackout to account for, such qualifiers are no longer 
necessary. Online advocacy has profoundly changed the policy 
dynamics around copyright, including policy outcomes. Going 
forward, it is much less likely that copyright will be expanded. The 
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content industry still shows every willingness to use the existing 
statutory and case law to its strategic advantage, and the SC 
coalition is still almost certainly strong enough to block any 
rollback of copyright. Yet it must now rethink its understanding 
about what is possible in Congress. 
 The SOPA strike should also serve as a wake-up call to all 
those who were surprised to learn that there were so many Internet 
users who have such strong beliefs on the issue. For those who are 
not members of the online public that actively debates technology 
law, it may have been surprising that copyright matters to those 
who do engage in such debates, but that surprise is not because 
passionate debates about technology law are hard to locate. The 
heavy users of the sites where technology law is debated—like 
Reddit and Slashdot—are not hard to hear from; quite the contrary, 
they share so many opinions on technology regulation and business 
models that one cannot possibly read them all. Yet media industry 
executives in particular continue to make decisions that, from the 
Internet public’s perspective, are beyond tone deaf.285 Even many 
in the technology sector and technology press were taken by 
surprise by the SOPA strike because this is not how they 
understand politics. They were surprised because, despite the 
Internet’s ability to empower end users, they still think of 
technology law as a battle between Hollywood and Silicon Valley. 
Hopefully, the SOPA strike will lead those policy actors and 
reporters who are not plugged in to strive harder to get in touch 
with the broader Internet public. That really would be good for 
everybody, although it would be uncomfortable in the short term 
for senior media industry executives. 
 If the SFU coalition and persuadable technology actors play 
their newly strengthened hand correctly—including, importantly, if 
the technology industry works more closely with SFU coalition 
groups—they will be able to slow the SC coalition’s political 
agenda to a substantial degree for the next several years. They have 
been playing defense for the entire digital era, but they would also 
be well served to advance their own agenda as well. One natural 
and somewhat likely path is pursuing impact litigation against 
ongoing government seizures of domain names. Especially since 
these are happening without an adversarial hearing in court, the 
                                                
285 For instance, Warner Brothers just started a program for customers to upload 
their DVDs for Internet streaming. Customers would need to drive to a physical 
store, pay the store to copy the data from the DVD to a server, wait for that 
copying, return home, and then play the movies via a protected cloud service. 
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constitutional arguments against the current process (or lack 
thereof) behind domain seizures could be fairly persuasive. 
Another more aggressive strategy, however, would be to begin 
advancing legislative proposals to roll back the reach of copyright 
in the digital era. Remember that it was SFU-allied members of 
Congress who proposed the OPEN Act, but now, they should use 
even this proposal as a bargaining chip in seeking more SFU-
oriented legislative reforms. They could push for a legislative end 
to the highly problematic ICE-administered domain seizures 
process, a law enacting the major DMCA reforms as proposed by 
Boucher through 2006, both, or yet other reforms. The SFU 
coalition is probably still not politically powerful enough to 
advance these proposals without giving up something in return, but 
as the OPEN Act demonstrates—even though it also has room for 
improvement—there are good ideas for how to improve 
enforcement without harming innocent bystanders or ignoring due 
process. If the SFU coalition can maintain this momentum, it will 
figure out how to stand as the gatekeeper withholding good ideas 
for improved enforcement, demanding the repeal of bad ideas of 
the past in return. 
Copyright watchers are not the only ones who should be 
interested in the history of the copyright debate. The SFU coalition 
was among the first underfunded coalitions to have so much 
success leveraging the Internet to identify sympathizers and spread 
its message. It is unsurprising, of course, that a coalition that is 
built almost exclusively of Internet enthusiasts would go online in 
droves to spread its message—and that it would find a sympathetic 
audience among other Internet enthusiasts. These enthusiasts were 
right when they envisioned a future where the Internet would 
revolutionize not only the media industries but also the debate 
about their future. For those without substantial resources who 
would like to mobilize around other policy issues, the SFU 
coalition’s story may even offer a good template for organizing in 
the Internet age. Though the model may not apply to every issue, 
the copyright debate shows that in at least some cases, a group can 
now move from virtual nonexistence to genuine competitiveness to 
transcendent victory in less time—and with less money—than ever 
before. As its biggest fans have been saying for years, the Internet 
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